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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the District Court err in determining as a matter 
of law that a creditor must bring a separate action in order to 
set aside a fraudulent conveyance, rather than executing directly 
upon the property? The District Court's determination of this 
issue constitutes a legal conclusion. It is reviewed for 
correctness and is afforded no deference by the Supreme Court. 
Territorial Sav, & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
App. 1989)• 
2. Did the District Court err in ruling that the statute 
of limitations barred any action by Burtons to set aside the 
alleged fraudulent conveyances by Mr. Wood? The District Court's 
determination of this issue constitutes a legal conclusion and is 
reviewed for correctness. Id. 
3. Did the District Court err in ruling that the Baldwins 
were bona fide purchasers of the Lauri Kay property? This issue 
appears to be factual in nature. However, the District Court 
disposed of the issue upon a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Therefore, it is reviewed for correctness, and is afforded no 
deference by the Supreme Court. Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456, note 4. 
4. Did the District Court err in ruling that Baldwins were 
entitled to an award of their attorney's fees as damages against 
Burtons? The District Court's determination of this issue 
constitutes a legal conclusion and is reviewed for correctness. 
Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781 P.2d at 456. 
5. Did the District Court err in awarding "paralegal 
costs" to Baldwins? The District Court's determination of this 
issue constitutes a legal conclusion and is reviewed for 
correctness. Id. 
6. Did the filing of bankruptcy by Mr. Wood on April 21, 
1983, or his subsequent discharge in bankruptcy on August 15, 
1983, affect Burtons' execution upon the Lauri Kay property? 
Although the District Court briefly mentioned this issue in its 
May 25, 1987 Memorandum Decision, the District Court made no 
expressed determination of the issue. Nevertheless, because this 
issue may be dispositive of some aspects of the present appeal, 
Appellants have addressed this issue herein. The issue is legal 
in nature, and is reviewed on a de novo basis by the Supreme 
Court. Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P.2d 860, 862 
(Ut. 1979). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
The following authorities may be dispositive of certain 
aspects of this Appeal: 
UCA 25-1-15 Rights of creditors with matured claims. 
Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, 
may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the 
time of the purchase or one who has derived title 
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser: 
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation 
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim; 
or 
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy 
execution upon, the property conveyed. 
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent 
has given less than a fair consideration for the 
conveyance or obligation may retain the property or 
obligation as security for repayment. 
UCA 78-22-1. Lien of judgment. 
From the time the judgment of the district court 
or circuit court is docketed and filed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court of the county it 
becomes a lien upon all the real property of the 
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the 
county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him 
at the time or by him thereafter acquired during the 
existence of said lien. A transcript of judgment 
rendered in a district court or circuit court of this 
state, in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed 
in the office of the clerk of the district court of any 
other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall 
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same 
force and effect as a judgment entered in the district 
court in such county. The lien shall continue for 
eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied 
or unless the enforcement of the judgment is stayed on 
appeal by the execution of a sufficient undertaking as 
provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment 
ceases. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an execution upon real property by the 
Burtons, which culminated in the issuance of a Sheriff's Deed to 
Burton Jr. and Emily Burton on May 7, 1987. Baldwins, who were 
the owners of the property on the date of execution, subsequently 
filed this action to set aside the Sheriff's Deed based upon the 
fact that Burtons' judgment debtor, Willard Wood, had no interest 
in the property at the time that Burton's Judgment was docketed. 
Burtons deny that Mr. Wood had no interest in the property. 
Following the filing of cross motions for summary judgments 
by Burtons and Baldwins, the District Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision, dated May 25, 1989, which held that Wood had no 
interest in the property at the time that Burtons' judgment was 
docketed, so that Burtons' subsequent execution upon the property 
was wrongful. The District Court awarded damages to Baldwin 
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consisting of attorney's fees and "related damages" in the amount 
of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-two and 6 6/10 0 Dollars 
($7,872.66). Such judgment included an unspecified amount for 
"paralegal costs." Burtons deny that Baldwins were entitled to 
an award of their attorney's fees or paralegal costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. During 1979 and 1980, Max D. Burton, Sr. ("Burton, 
Sr."), Willard D. Wood ("Mr. Wood") and Clealon B. Mann 
("Mr. Mann") were partners in a land development and subdivision 
enterprise known as Woodcove Subdivision. (R. 046.) 
2. On May 15, 197 9 Mr. Wood and his wife, Tonya G. Wood 
("Mrs. Wood"), as buyers, and Ralph L. Kofoed and Elaine 
L. Kofoed ("Kofoeds") , as sellers, entered into a Uniform Real 
Estate Contract, whereby the Woods purchased the Kofoeds' 
interest in certain real property ("the Lauri Kay property"), 
which is the subject matter of this action. (R. 226-228.) 
3. On December 19, 1979 the Kofoeds, as grantors, executed 
a Warranty Deed in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Wood, as joint tenants, 
thereby conveying Kofoeds' interest in the Lauri Kay property to 
the Woods. Said Warranty Deed was recorded December 19, 1979. 
(R. 229.) 
4. During 19 8 0 an Agreement was reached between the 
aforenamed partners of the Woodcove Subdivision whereby Mr. Wood 
and Mr. Mann purchased Burton, Sr.'s interest in the project. 
Pursuant to said Agreement, Mr. Wood and Mr. Mann executed a 
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Promissory Note, dated February 6, 1980, in favor of Burton, 
Sr. and his wife, Emily A. Burton ("Mrs. Burton") in the amount 
of Thirty-five Thousand Dollars ($35,000.00). (R. 046, 233.) 
5. On May 1, 1980 Mr. Wood purported to convey his 
interest in the Lauri Kay property to Mrs. Wood by way of a 
Special Warranty Deed. Said Special Warranty Deed cites as 
consideration: "The sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and 
valuable consideration . . . ." (Emphasis in original.) 
(R. 007.) 
6. On May 26, 19 80, Mr. and Mrs. Wood executed a Trust 
Deed in favor of Valley Bank and Trust ("Valley Bank"), through 
which the Lauri Kay property was transferred as security for a 
loan from Valley Bank to Woods in the amount of Twenty Thousand 
Dollars ($20,000.00). (R. 560.) 
7. On February 25, 1981 Burton, Sr. and Mrs. Burton 
commenced a legal action against Mr. Wood and Mr. Mann in the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
Case No. C-81-1568, seeking recovery of amounts due under the 
February 6, 1980 Promissory Note which were in default, plus 
interest. (R. 046, 231-232.) 
8. On June 9, 1981, Summary Judgment was entered in 
said legal action in favor of Burton, Sr. and Mrs. Burton and 
against Mr. Wood and Mr. Mann, jointly and severally, in the 
amount of Thirty-eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($3 8,500.00) 
plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. (R. 047, 234.) 
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9. Prior to August 1981, Woods listed the Lauri Kay 
property for sale with Jean Lampe, a local realtor. The listing 
agreement was signed by Mr. Wood as the owner of the home. 
(R. 501.) 
10. In August of 1981, Gregory Baldwin ("Mr. Baldwin") 
and Lynda C. Baldwin ("Mrs. Baldwin") entered into negotiations 
for the purchase of Woods1 interest within the Lauri Kay 
property. During such negotiations, Mr. Wood stated that he was 
"under some financial duress," and was willing to take a lower 
price on the home." Deposition of Gregory Baldwin, dated 
November 11, 1987 (hereinafter cited as "Baldwin Depo."), 
page 5.1 
11. On August 24, 1981 Baldwins received a Commitment for 
Title Insurance ("Title Report") prepared by Western States Title 
Company ("Western States"). Said Title Report stated in part 
that: "Judgments have been searched in the names of 
. . . Willard D. Wood . . . and none were found of record." 
(R. 089-091.) 
12. Notwithstanding the above-quoted statement within the 
August 24, 1981 Title Report regarding judgments in the name of 
Willard Wood, at the time that Western States issued said Title 
Report, its agents had actual knowledge of the June 9, 1981 
judgment of Burton Sr. against Mr. Wood. Western States1 agents 
^The depositions of Gregory Baldwin and Willard Wood were 
published in the District Court (R. 135-136). 
have stated that they "do not recall" the reason that Burton 
Sr.'s judgment was omitted from the Title Report. (R. 110, 
138) . 
13. On August 23, 1981 the Baldwins and the Woods entered 
into an Earnest Money Agreement for the purchase and sale 
of the Lauri Kay property. (R. 153-154.) Page 2 of said Earnest 
Money Agreement states in part: "Acceptance of offer contingent 
upon the successful transfer of lien from 2257 E. Laurie Kay 
Drive to building property by Valley Mortgage already agreed 
upon and scheduled to close on or before September 20, 
1981." [sic] According to the Deposition of Willard Wood, dated 
November 11, 1987 (hereinafter cited as "Wood Depo."), page 
17, this provision was placed in the Earnest Money Agreement at 
the behest of Baldwins. However, Gregory Baldwin testified that 
he was not familiar with the provision. (Baldwin Depo., page 
9.) The Earnest Money Agreement was signed by both Mr. and 
Mrs. Wood as "Seller." 
14. At the time that Woods and Baldwins commenced 
negotiations related to Baldwins1 purchase of the property, the 
property was listed by Woods for sale at Two Hundred Sixty-five 
Thousand Dollars ($265,000.00). As consideration for their 
purchase of the home, Baldwins paid Woods Fifty-seven Thousand 
Twenty-four and 33/100 Dollars ($57,024.33), assumed a first 
mortgage to Equitable Life Insurance Company in the amount of 
Twenty-five Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Dollars ($25,780.00), 
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and assumed the Woods' obligation to Kofoeds under the May 15, 
1979 Uniform Real Estate Contract, in the amount of One Hundred 
Twenty-one Thousand Six Hundred Ninety-five and 67/100 Dollars 
($121,695.67). (R. 153; Wood Depo., page 21.) 
15. On September 30, 1981 Woods executed a Trust Deed upon 
the Lauri Kay property in favor of Kofoeds in consideration of 
Kofoeds1 remaining equity within the property. Said Trust Deed 
was recorded on October 2, 1981. Mr. Wood signed said Trust Deed 
because, notwithstanding his execution of the May 1, 1980 Special 
Trust Deed to Mrs. Wood, he "still regarded [himself] as having 
an interest in said property." (R. 071; R. 235.) Mr. Wood also 
appears as a "Seller" upon the Sellers' Settlement Statement and 
the Buyers' Settlement Statement, each dated September 30, 1981. 
(R. 236-237.) 
16. Also on September 30, 1981 Mr. and Mrs. Wood executed a 
Warranty Deed upon the Lauri Kay property in favor of Baldwins, 
subject only to the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed from Woods to 
Kofoeds and the underlying mortgage to Equitable Life Assurance 
Company, dated October 16, 1967. Said Warranty Deed was prepared 
by Western States and notarized by their closing agent and was 
recorded on October 2, 1981. (R. 238.) According to Baldwins, 
Mr. Wood executed said Warranty Deed because he appeared "to have 
some naked interest of record" in the property by virtue of his 
execution of the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed to Kofoeds. 
(R. 410; R. 413.) 
17. On February 24, 1982 a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment 
was entered in the Burtons v. Wood/Mann lawsuit, pursuant to 
which Mann was released from the Judgment, and Burtons reserved 
their cause of action against Wood for the balance of the 
Judgment, consisting of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty-three 
and 73/100 Dollars ($4,323.73) plus interest. (R. 240.) 
18. On April 21, 1983 Mr. and Mrs. Wood filed a petition 
for voluntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the United States 
Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of 
Utah, Central Division. Burtons were listed as creditors within 
said bankruptcy proceeding. Kofoeds were not listed as 
creditors. The Lauri Kay property was not listed as an asset of 
the Woods. (R. 242-243.) Woods were discharged in bankruptcy on 
August 15, 1983 and their bankruptcy case was closed on December 
15, 1985. (R. 470.) 
19. During the summer of 1986 Burton, Sr. received a 
Notice of Default which indicated that the Lauri Kay property 
was about to be foreclosed under the September 30, 1981 Kofoed 
Trust Deed. Upon investigation, Burton, Sr. obtained a copy of a 
foreclosure report prepared by Surety Title Company, dated May 8, 
1986. Said foreclosure report indicated that Burtons1 judgment 
lien had attached to the Lauri Kay property behind the first 
mortgage of the Equitable Life Assurance Company and ahead of the 
September 30, 1981 Trust Deed from Woods to Kofoeds. (R. 047, 
050-055.) 
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20. Prior to Burton Sr.'s receipt of the Notice of Default 
during the summer of 1986, Burtons had no knowledge of the May 1, 
1980 conveyance from Mr, Wood to Mrs. Wood. (R. 047.) 
21. On August 6, 1986 Burtons, through their prior 
attorney, obtained a Writ of Execution from the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, upon their 
Judgment against Mr. Wood. Said Writ commanded the sheriff or 
constable of Salt Lake County to levy upon and sell enough of the 
unexempt personal property or real property of Willard D. Wood to 
satisfy the Burtons1 Judgment. (R. 037.) 
22. On or about August 6, 1986 Burtons, through their 
prior attorney, issued a Praecipe directing the sheriff of Salt 
Lake County to levy upon the interest of Baldwins as 
"successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood," in the Lauri Kay 
property. (R. 245-246.) 
23. On August 11, 1986 the Salt Lak;e County Sheriff's 
Office issued a Notice of Real Estate Levy upon the interest of 
" G r e g o r y B l a k e B a l d w i n and L i n d a B a l d w i n as 
successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood . . ."in the Lauri Kay 
property. Said Notice of Real Estate Levy was recorded with the 
Salt Lake County Recorder on August 12, 1986. (R. 247.) 
24. On August 12, 1986 the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office issued a Notice of Real Estate Sale upon the interest of 
"Gregory Blake Baldwin and Linda Baldwin, successors-in-interest 
of Willard D. Wood . . ."in the Lauri Kay property. (R. 0 08.) 
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25. During approximately September of 1986 Max D. Burton, 
Jr. ("Burton, Jr.") purchased an assignment of Burton, Sr.'s 
interest in the Burton Judgment against Mr. Wood. (R. 266.) 
26. On September 9, 1986 the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office conducted an Execution Sale wherein Burton, Jr. and 
Mrs. Burton purchased the interest of the Baldwin's "as 
successors-in-interest of Willard D. Wood" in the Lauri Kay 
property. (R. 075-076.) Although Baldwins had notice of said 
execution sale, they did not attend or object to the sale, nor 
did Baldwins subsequently redeem the property. (R. 262.) 
27. On January 16, 1987 the beneficial interest of Kofoeds 
under the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed was assigned to Robert 
L. Rice ("Mr. Rice"). (R. 260.) Mr. Rice is a personal friend 
and former Bishop of the Baldwins. (R. 505.) 
28. During approximately January of 1987, Burton 
Sr. engaged in a conversation with Mr. Wood, wherein Mr. Wood 
stated that the reason for his execution of the May 1, 1980 
Special Warranty Deed to Mrs. Wood was to protect the property 
from his creditors, and that he had received no consideration 
from Mrs. Wood for the transfer. (R. 047-048). Mr. Wood 
subsequently testified that the purpose for the transfer was to 
protect the property from his creditors, and that he received no 
consideration for the transfer. (Wood Depo., page 12.) 
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2 9 . Dur ing May of 1987, Mr. Rice commenced a p r i v a t e 
f o r e c l o s u r e a c t i o n under the September 30, 1981 Trus t Deed. 
(R. 270.) 
30 . On May 7, 1987 the Sal t Lake County She r i f f ' s Office 
issued a She r i f f ' s Deed conveying to Burton, J r . and Mrs. Burton 
t h e i n t e r e s t of "Gregory Blake Baldwin and Linda Baldwin, 
succes so r s - i n - i n t e r e s t of Willard D. Wood . . . " i n the Lauri Kay 
p r o p e r t y . Said S h e r i f f ' s Deed was recorded on May 8, 1987. 
(R. 075-076.) 
31. On June 10, 1987 Mr. Rice bid at the Trustee's Sale on 
the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed and received a "Trustee's Deed" 
on the property. Said Trustee's Deed was recorded June 18, 
1987. (R. 269-271.) 
32. On June 18, 1987 Robert L. Rice, as grantor, executed a 
Warranty Deed in favor of Derald A. Tilley, as grantee, upon the 
Lauri Kay Property. Said Warranty Deed was recorded June 18, 
1987. (R. 272.) 
33. On October 7, 1987, Derald A. Tilley, as grantor, 
executed a Quit Claim Deed in favor of Lynda C. Baldwin, upon the 
Lauri Kay property. Said Quit Claim Deed was recorded on 
October 8, 1987. (R. 280.) 
34. On June 22, 1988, Lynda C. Baldwin, as grantor, 
executed a Quit Claim Deed in favor of the Lynda C. Baldwin 
Trust, upon the Lauri Kay property. Said Quit Claim Deed was 
recorded on June 23, 1988. (R. 281.) 
35. The present action was filed on May 12, 1987. The 
Plaintiffs were initially designated as "Lynda Baldwin and 
Gregory Blake Baldwin." (R. 002.) On January 3, 1989 an Amended 
Complaint was filed in which Lynda C. Baldwin, in her own name 
and on behalf of the Lynda Baldwin Trust, was named as the sole 
plaintiff. (R. 189; R. 281.) (Lynda C. Baldwin and the Lynda C. 
Baldwin Trust are hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"Baldwin.") 
36. On March 3, 19 89 Baldwin filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment upon her claims against the Burtons in the present 
action. (R. 423-424.) Following the submission of affidavits 
and legal memoranda by both parties, the District Court, per the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, issued its Memorandum Decision dated 
May 25, 1987 (R. 572-579), a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A," in which the Court held in 
summary: 
(a) that at the time the Burton Judgment was entered 
against Mr. Wood, Mr. Wood had no interest within the Lauri Kay 
property to which said Judgment could attach; 
(b) that if Burtons believed that the conveyance 
from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was fraudulent Burtons were required 
to file a separate action to set aside such fraudulent 
conveyance; 
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(c) tha t the s t a t u t e of l im i t a t i ons upon an act ion by 
Burtons to se t as ide the conveyance from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood as 
fraudulent had passed; 
(d) t h a t t h e Ba ldwins were bona f i d e p u r c h a s e r s 
of the Lauri Kay proper ty; 
(e) t h a t the September 9, 1986 execu t ion s a l e and 
the May 7, 1987 She r i f f ' s Deed to Burton J r . and Mrs. Burton are 
nu l l and void; 
( f ) t h a t B u r t o n s had w r o n g f u l l y e x e c u t e d upon 
Baldwin's i n t e r e s t within the Lauri Kay proper ty; 
(g) t h a t Mr. Wood f i l e d f o r bankruptcy on Apr i l 
21, 1983 and l i s t e d Burton Sr. as a judgment c r e d i t o r . Mr. Wood 
was subsequently discharged in bankruptcy; and 
(h) t h a t the only remaining i s s u e of f a c t was the 
amount of Mrs. Baldwin's damages, including a t t o r n e y ' s f ees . 
37 . On Apr i l 5, 1991 Ba ldwin , t h r o u g h h e r a t t o r n e y , 
Dwight Epperson, f i l ed an Affidavit of At torney 's Fees, which se t 
f o r t h , i n t e r a l i a , the sum of Three Thousand One Hundred 
Ninety- two Do l l a r s ($3,192.00) in a t t o r n e y ' s fees , Two Hundred 
Forty-f ive Dol lars ($245.00) in " s e c r e t a r i a l f e e s , " and Nine 
Thousand One Hundred Ninety-five and 19/100 Dollars ($9,195.19) 
in "paralegal c o s t s . " (R. 641-658.) 
38 . On Apr i l 17, 1990, Bur tons , through t h e i r p r e s e n t 
a t torney , f i l ed a Defendants' Object ion t o Proposed Order and 
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Judgment Approving Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees and Costs, wherein 
Burtons argued that Baldwin was not entitled to an award of her 
attorney's fees, secretarial fees or paralegal costs on the 
grounds that there was no legal basis for such an award. 
(R. 659-663.) 
39. After conducting a hearing upon the matter of Baldwin's 
attorney's fees and related damages on May 14, 199 0, the District 
Court entered a Judgment, dated June 4, 1990, which ordered 
that Burtons pay to Baldwin the amount of Seven Thousand Eight 
Hundred Seventy-two and 66/100 Dollars ($7,872.66), "representing 
payment for attorney's fees and related damages incurred by 
Plaintiff in this matter, together with interest thereon at the 
legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from the date of this 
Judgment." (R. 667-668.) Said Judgment constitutes the final 
Judgment from which this Appeal is taken. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Willard Wood did have an interest in the subject property at 
the time that Burtons' judgment lien was docketed. In addition, 
any conveyance by Mr. Wood of his interest in the property was 
fraudulent and, therefore, Burtons were entitled to disregard 
such conveyance and execute upon the property pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated Section 25-1-15(2). 
POINT II 
Burtons' execution upon the property did not involve, nor 
did it require, any action to set aside the prior conveyance by 
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Mr. Wood as a fraudulent conveyance. Therefore, the applicable 
statute of limitations in this case is the eight-year period for 
executing upon judgments established by Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-22-1. In the alternative, an issue of fact exists as 
to the date that Burtons should have discovered the fraudulent 
nature of Mr. Wood's conveyance. 
POINT III 
Baldwins were not bona fide purchasers of the property 
because they had both constructive and actual notice of the 
Burtons1 lien. 
POINT IV 
Baldwins were not entitled to an award of their attorney's 
fees, inasmuch as there is no statutory or contractual bases for 
such an award, and Burtons did not exercise bad faith in 
conducting their execution on the property. 
POINT V 
Even if Baldwin was entitled to an award of her attorney's 
fees, she was not entitled to recover "paralegal costs" inasmuch 
as there is no statutory basis for such an award, and the 
paralegal costs claimed in this case were not an adjunct of 
attorney's fees. 
POINT VI 
The discharge of Mr. and Mrs. Wood in bankruptcy on December 
15, 1983 had no effect upon Burtons' judgment lien, as specified 
in 11 U.S.C. Section 524 and 506(d). 
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A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
HOLDING THAT BURTONS WERE REQUIRED 
TO BRING A SEPARATE ACTION IN ORDER TO SET 
ASIDE THE ALLEGED FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES BY MR, WOOD 
The District Court held, on page 5 of its Memorandum 
Decision: 
If Burton believed that the Willard Wood conveyance to 
Tanya Wood was a fraudulent conveyance, made to defraud 
creditors, then he should have filed an action to have 
the said conveyance set aside so that his lien rights 
could be perfected. In such action, he would have 
named the Woods and the Baldwins as defendant, which 
would have given the Baldwins the right to litigate 
this issue, and have their due process rights 
protected. However, such was never done. Title has 
remained at all times in the Baldwins, and was in the 
Baldwins at the time Burton proceeded against the said 
property. (R. 576.) 
Burtons submit that this holding by the District Court was 
erroneous as a matter of law, inasmuch as the Utah Fraudulent 
Conveyances Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-1 et seq.,2 
establishes that conveyances which are made with the intent to 
defraud creditors are void, and that creditors may disregard such 
^This case is governed by the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances 
Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-let seq., which was first 
enacted by Utah Laws, 1925, ch. 42, Sec. 1. The Fraudulent 
Conveyances Act was repealed by Utah Laws, 1988, ch. 58, Sec. 16, 
and was replaced by the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act, Utah Code 
Annotated Section 25-6-1 et seq., effective April 25, 1988. The 
Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act governs this action because it 
was in effect on the date of the alleged fraudulent transfers. 
Smith v. Edwards, 17 P.2d 264 (Utah 1932); Blankenship v. Myers, 
544 P.2d 314, 324 (Id. 1975). A true and correct copy of the 
1977 edition of the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act is appended 
hereto as Exhibit "B." 
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conveyances and execute upon the property conveyed.3 
Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-8 states: 
When conveyance or assignment void. Every 
conveyance or assignment, in writing or otherwise, of 
any estate or interest in lands, or in goods or things 
in action, or of rents or profits issuing therefrom, 
and every charge upon lands, goods or things in action 
or upon the rents or profits thereof, made with the 
intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, or other 
persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, 
debts or demands, and every bond or other evidence of 
debt given, suits commenced, or decree or judgment 
suffered, with the like intent, as against the person 
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be void. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Under Utah law, a fraudulent conveyance is not merely 
voidable, but is void in toto. W.P. Noble Mercantile 
Co. v. Mt. Pleasant Equitable Co-op. InSt., 42 P# 869 (Utah 
1894) . When a conveyance is found void under the Utah Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act, it is treated "as if the transaction never took 
place at all." Meyer v. General American Corporation, 569 P.2d 
1094, 1098 (Utah 1977). Cardon v. Harper, 151 P.2d 99, 102 
(Ut. 1944). 
Baldwin argued at length in the District Court that the word 
"void" within Section 25-1-8 means "voidable." (R. 527-529.) 
^There are actually two potential fraudulent conveyances by 
Mr. Wood in the present case. The first occurred through the May 
1, 1980 Special Warranty Deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood, which 
Mr. Wood admits was performed for the purpose of shielding the 
home from his creditors. (R. 048.) The second consisted of 
Mr. Wood's execution of the September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed to 
the Baldwins. If Mr. Wood's May 1, 1980 conveyance to Mrs. Wood 
was fraudulent, then it was void, and Mr. Wood still possessed 
his joint interest in the property at the time he executed the 
September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed to Mr. and Mrs. Baldwin. 
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However, Baldwin did not address the Utah cases, including those 
cited above, which are to the contrary. Baldwin also failed to 
address Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-15, which states: 
Rights of creditors with matured claims. Where a 
conveyance or obligation is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, such creditor, when his claim has matured, 
may, as against any person, except a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the 
time of the purchase or one who has derived title 
immediately or mediately from such a purchaser: 
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation 
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim? 
or, 
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy 
execution upon, the property conveyed, 
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent 
has given less than a fair consideration for the 
conveyance or obligation may retain the property or 
obligation as security for repayment. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This statute expressly allows creditors to disregard a 
fraudulent conveyance, and to execute upon property which is 
under the name of the fraudulent transferee. For example, in 
Jensen v. Eames, 519 P.2d 236 (Utah 1974), the plaintiff obtained 
a judgment against the defendant, and subsequently served a 
post-judgment garnishment upon a third party, to whom the 
defendant had transferred certain shares of stock. Within the 
garnishment proceeding, the plaintiff moved to have the transfer 
of stock set aside as a fraudulent conveyance. The trial court 
denied the motion on the ground that such action could not be 
taken in a garnishment proceeding and that the plaintiff must 
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file a separate action. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
decision of the trial court on this issue, holding, at page 428: 
A judgment creditor may litigate the question of a 
fraudulent conveyance in a garnishment proceedings, in 
a creditor's bill in equity, or in an execution 
proceeding, provided that once contested the burden is 
upon the one alleging the fraudulent conveyance to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 
transfer was in fact fraudulent. 
The Decision in Jensen is similar to that which has been 
reached in other states when construing similar provisions of the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. For example, in Gagne 
v. Bailey, 564 P.2d 348 (Wash. App. 1977), the debtor quit 
claimed a one-half interest in two parcels of real property to 
her son. The plaintiffs subsequently obtained a judgment against 
the debtor and executed upon the property, which execution was 
upheld by the Court at page 349: 
A judgment creditor may choose to levy execution 
upon a parcel which has been fraudulently conveyed in 
whole or in part by the judgment debtor without first 
clearing title. One who purchases such a parcel at an 
execution sale can clear that title by an appropriate 
action. But until that time, the fraudulent conveyance 
may be successfully attacked by a superior interest. 
(Citations deleted.) 
Similar results were reached in the cases of Montana Ass'n 
of Credit Management v. Hergert, 593 P.2d 1059 (Mont. 1979) and 
Sackin v. Kersting, 458 P.2d 544 (Ariz. App. 1969). See 
generally, 37 Am.Jur.2d, "Fraudulent Conveyances," Section 161. 
The District Court's Memorandum Decision suggests that the 
literal application of Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-15(2) 
would deprive Baldwin of her interest in the real property 
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without due process. However, an alleged fraudulent transferee 
in circumstances such as the present case can assert any defenses 
she may have in the execution proceeding, or commence a separate 
action, such as Baldwin did in the present case. The procedure 
established by Utah Code Annotated Section 25-1-15(2) is 
necessary to ensure that the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
achieves its purpose of allowing creditors to '"reach all 
artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force 
and effect in preventing debtors from paying the just claims of 
their creditors." Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 
1987) .4 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN RULING THAT ANY CLAIM OF FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCE BY BURTONS IS BARRED BY LIMITATIONS 
On page 6 of its Memorandum Decision, the District Court 
stated: 
Burton's lien is only to that property owned by 
Willard Wood, but Willard Wood conveyed the property to 
Tanya Wood on May 1, 1980 and Tanya Wood conveyed the 
property to the Baldwins on September 30, 1981. No 
action has been filed to set that conveyance aside, and 
the Burtons have not so pled in this action. The 
statute of limitations has run on bringing an action 
for fraudulent conveyance and, therefore, the Court 
rules as a matter of law that Willard Wood has no 
ownership interest in the property in question, and has 
^The Utah Fradulent Transfer Act continues to allow 
creditors to execute upon fraudulently conveyed property within 
the possession of the transferee, although it appears to require 
an express order for such executions. UCA Section 25-6-8(2). 
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not had such since conveying away in May of 1980 and, 
therefore, Burton can establish no rights to any 
interest in the said property. 
The District Court's conclusion regarding limitations 
appears to have been based upon its assumption that Burtons were 
required to bring a specific action to set aside the fraudulent 
conveyance, rather than directly executing upon the property. As 
argued within the preceding Point I hereof, this assumption by 
the District Court was error because the Utah Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act expressly allowed the type of execution which was 
performed by Burtons. 
The District Court did not address the issue of when 
Burton's cause of action to set aside the fraudulent transfer 
accrued. However, that issue was addressed at length within 
Baldwin's Reply Memorandum Regarding Plaintiff's Motions for 
Summary Judgment, dated April 24, 1989 (hereinafter cited as 
"Reply Memorandum"). On pages 11 through 19 (R. 517-525) of her 
Reply Memorandum, Baldwin argues that Burton's cause of action to 
set aside the fraudulent conveyance accrued either at the time 
that the deed from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was recorded, or from 
the date of Burton's judgment. In support of this argument 
Baldwin cites several cases from other jurisdictions.5 
5Baldwins also assert that the applicable limitations period 
for Burtons' claim to set aside the fraudulent conveyance is 
established by Utah Code Annotated Section 25-6-10 of the Utah 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, and Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-12-25(2). These provisions did not become effective until 
- 23 -
Regard less of the p o s i t i o n s which have been taken within 
other j u r i s d i c t i o n s , the law within the S ta te of Utah i s t ha t the 
s t a t u t e of l im i t a t i ons upon a fraudulent conveyance commences a t 
the time t h a t the fraudulent conveyance i s discovered. In Smith 
v . Edwards, 17 P.2d 264 (Ut. 1932), the defendants made several 
a l l e g e d f raudulen t conveyances of r ea l proper ty to t h e i r sons, 
which were recorded on December 23, 1920. The p l a i n t i f f s brought 
s u i t t o i n v a l i d a t e t h e conveyance in 1928. In addressing the 
defendants ' l i m i t a t i o n s defense, the Court s t a t e d : 
The p a r t i e s agree the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i s 
t h r e e y e a r s . They d i v i d e on t h e q u e s t i o n of 
discovery. They approach the quest ion d i f f e r e n t l y . 
Some argue the r e c o r d i n g of t he deed i m p a r t s 
n o t i c e t o a l l pe r sons of the c o n t e n t s t h e r e o f and 
c o n s t i t u t e s such no t i ce as w i l l s t a r t t h e s t a t u t e of 
l im i t a t i ons running as to a c r e d i t o r who may claim to 
be re ly ing upon ownership, or impl ied ownership , of 
p r o p e r t y as shown by the s t a t e of the record. Some 
argue otherwise . Some aspects may be examined: (1) 
Was the conveyance i t s e l f the fraud? or (2) was i t 
fraud because the conveyance purported to be voluntary 
or wi thou t cons ide ra t ion? or (3) did the conveyance 
produce d i s c o v e r a b l e i n so lvency a t t he t ime i t was 
made? If the conveyance i t s e l f cons t i t u t ed the fraud, 
i t s r e c o r d a t i o n was n o t i c e of i t s c o n t e n t s t o a l l 
persons . . . . 
Apri l 25, 1988 and are, therefore, inapplicable to the present case. 
The applicable l imitat ions period for any fraudulent conveyances 
occurring in the present case is established by Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-12-26(3). Smith Land Co. v. Johnson, 107 P.2d 158 (Utah 
1940). 
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The conveyances attacked all contain the statement 
of consideration of "one dollar and other valuable 
considerations" and one of them contains in addition 
the statement that two of the tracts are each subject 
to a mortgage in the "sum of $1,000.00 which the 
grantee assumes and agrees to pay." 
Under the statute from the time of filing the 
conveyance with the recorder it shall impart notice to 
all persons of the contents thereof. From the time of 
recording these conveyances all persons, including 
plaintiffs, notice was imparted to them that the 
conveyances contained the statements above quoted. 
That the plaintiffs and all other persons had notice 
that such conveyances had been made and recorded seems 
to go without saying, for surely, if one is charged 
with notice of the contents, he must be charged with 
notice of the existence of the document itself. When 
the document contains a statement of facts indicating 
that there was given for the property a fair 
consideration when as a fact no consideration at all 
had been given, a very different situation is presented 
than a document showing on its face that there was no 
consideration or only a nominal consideration. Under 
such circumstances all persons would be entitled to 
rely upon and would have imparted to them the 
information contained in the contents of the document, 
and until some information came to hand sufficient to 
put a reasonably prudent person upon inquiry he would 
be entitled to rely upon the contents of the document. 
It may be argued that fraud in the first situation 
consisted of the false statement contained in the 
document, because no consideration passed and there is 
the false statement in the document that there was a 
valuable consideration. The fraud was committed at 
that time but may not be discoverable then. A creditor 
would not discover the falsity of the statement until 
other information was brought to his attention 
sufficient to put him on inquiry. 
The Court further stated, quoting the case of Duxburg 
v. Boice, 72 N.W. 838, 839 (Minn. 1897) that "Mere constructive 
notice of the deed by reason of its being filed for record is not 
notice of the facts constituting fraud." 
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The Smith Court ultimately held that the action was barred 
by limitations, based upon the factual circumstances existing at 
and subsequent to the time of the conveyances. Smith, 17 P.2d at 
27 2. However, the Court clearly rejected the notion that mere 
constructive knowledge of a transfer, created by the recording of 
a deed, is equivalent to discovery of the fraudulent nature of a 
conveyance. See also Leach v. Anderson, 535 P.2d 1241 
(Ut. 1975) . 
Subsequent to the decision in Smith v. Edwards, the Utah 
Legislature enacted 57-3-2(4) which states: 
The fact that a recorded document recites only a 
nominal consideration, names the grantee as trustee, or 
otherwise purports to be in trust without naming 
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does 
not charge any third person with notice of any interest 
of the grantor or of the interest of any other person 
not named in the document. 
Under this provision, a statement of nominal consideration 
within a recorded deed, such as that from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood 
in the present case, does not impart notice of any interest in 
the property retained by the grantor. Therefore, the recital of 
nominal consideration within the May 1, 1980 Warranty Deed from 
Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was not sufficient in itself to give 
constructive notice of the fraudulent nature of the conveyance. 
In fact, the recitation of nominal consideration within deeds is 
so common that, as a practical matter, such recitals impart no 
such notice (See e.g., R. 006, R.143, R. 272.) 
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The record before the District Court is devoid of any facts 
indicating whether Burtons should or could have discovered the 
fraudulent nature of Mr. Wood's conveyances prior to the time 
that Burtons executed upon the property. Woods' bankruptcy in 
April of 1983 is not probative as to Mr. Wood's solvency in 1980 
or 1981. There is no evidence of any other judgments or claims 
cigainst Woods during the relevant time period. To the contrary, 
it appears that Woods paid off their lien to Valley Bank with 
their proceeds from the sale to Baldwins (Wood Depo., pages 
25-26). 
If Burtons had conducted a title search on the property at 
any time subsequent to September 30, 19 81, such search would have 
revealed that their lien had attached to the property ahead of 
Kofoeds' Trust Deed. Burtons would also see that the Kofoed 
Trust Deed and the Baldwin Warranty Deed had been signed by 
Mr. Wood. With such information, Burtons could reasonably 
conclude that the conveyance from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood could be 
disregarded, and that the property could be executed upon at any 
time within the period prescribed by UCA Section 78-22-1. The 
Woods' conveyance to Baldwins would be no problem, since Baldwins 
apparently took the property subject to Burtons' lien. 
Whether Mr. Wood's conveyances were fraudulent is immaterial 
in this case, because both the interest of Mr. Wood in the 
property and Burtons' judgment lien were of record at the time 
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that Baldwins purchased the property, and because UCA Section 
25-1-15(2) allowed Burtons to disregard any fraudulent conveyance 
that might otherwise affect their lien. Therefore, Baldwins took 
the property subject to Burtons' lien, and Burtons were entitled 
to execute upon the property. The applicable limitations period 
for such execution was not UCA 78-12-26(3), but the eight-year 
period established by UCA 78-22-1. As stated in 37 Am.Jur.2d, 
Fraudulent Conveyances, Section 193: 
The statute of limitations does not have the 
effect of converting a fraudulent deed into a valid 
deed by reason of the lapse of the prescribed time? it 
simply forbids the right of action for relief on the 
ground of fraud. Hence, if the question as to the 
fraudulent character of the deed arises in any way 
other than in such an action, there is nothing in the 
statute which forbids its being assailed for fraud. 
Thus, one who has made out a prima facie case for the 
recovery of land is not prevented from attacking as 
fraudulent a deed which is set up in defense, because 
the time for bringing an action to set aside the 
conveyance as fraudulent has expired. And the remedy 
of foreclosure by a creditor who has obtained a 
judgment that a conveyance is fraudulent may be pursued 
by the creditor even when his equitable action to set 
aside a conveyance has been barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
A suit to remove a cloud on the title to property 
caused by a fraudulent conveyance thereof is not one 
for relief on the ground of fraud; and it is therefore 
not subject to the limitation imposed by statute on 
such a suit. An action at law by the execution 
purchaser to test the validity of his title is not 
necessarily barred because the judgment creditor has 
lost, by lapse of time, his equitable remedy to set 
aside the fraudulent conveyance. 
In the case of Aberdeen Federal Sav. & Loan v. Hanson, 794 
P.2d 1322 (Wash. App. 1990), the plaintiff sought to garnish 
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property in 1987 which had allegedly been fraudulently 
transferred in 1984. In response to the defendant's limitation 
defense, the plaintiff argued that limitations was not governed 
by the three-year statute of limitations for fraud, but by the 
ten-year limitations period applicable to judgments. The trial 
court accepted this argument. However, the Washington Court of 
Appeals disagreed, holding at page 1324: 
Aberdeen Federal argues that the ten-year period 
of RCW 4.16.02 0 should apply because this action is 
primarily an effort to collect on a judgment. The 
gravamen of the claim determines the applicable statute 
of limitation. The three-year limitation of RCW 
4.16.080(4) applies to fraudulent conveyance actions. 
Aberdeen Federal seeks two distinct types of 
relief. First, it seeks to set aside the fraudulent 
conveyance. Second, it seeks to execute on the 
property to satisfy its judgment. In this step of the 
proceedings the gravamen of the claim is an action to 
set aside a purported fraudulent conveyance. Thus, the 
three-year statute of limitations applies. (Citations 
omitted.) 
The Washington Court of Appeals nevertheless affirmed the 
trial court's decision because the fraud was first discovered 
within the three-year period. Id. at 1325. 
Aberdeen Federal Sav. & Loan illustrates an important 
distinction in the present case. The "gravamen" of the present 
case is merely an execution action. Burtons have not requested 
that any fraudulent conveyance be set aside because such request 
is unnecessary, inasmuch as Burtons' judgment lien is of record. 
It makes no difference to Burton whether Mr. Wood's Deed to 
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Mrs. Wood was fraudulent , or non-del ivered, or superseded by an 
u n r e c o r d e d r e c o n v e y a n c e by Mrs . Wood, o r w h a t e v e r . The 
f r a u d u l e n t conveyance i ssue was f i r s t r a i sed by Baldwins as a 
defense to Burtons' execut ion. 
There i s a t l e a s t an issue of fact in t h i s case as to when 
B u r t o n s s h o u l d have d i s c o v e r e d t h e f r a u d u l e n t n a t u r e of 
Mr. Wood's c o n v e y a n c e s . B u r t o n s submi t t h a t , unde r t h e 
appl icable s t a t u t e , they were not required to br ing an ac t ion to 
s e t a s i d e such conveyances , which p r i o r to the f i l i n g of the 
present ac t i on , would have seemed s u p e r f l u o u s . Burtons were 
j u s t i f i e d in d is regarding the a l leged fraudulent conveyances and 
the imponderable mess of Woods' and Baldwins' deal ings with the 
proper ty , and execute upon t h e i r l i e n . 
POINT I I I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN RULING THAT BALDWIN WAS A 
BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE PROPERTY 
Baldwin argued throughout the District Court proceeding that 
she was a bona fide purchaser of the Lauri Kay property and, as 
such, took the property free from Burtons' judgment lien. The 
District Court implicitly accepted this argument in its 
Memorandum Decision (R. 576-577). However, Burtons submit that 
Baldwin was not a bona fide purchaser as a matter of law, or, in 
the alternative, that the evidence presented to the District 
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Court created a material issue of fact as to Baldwin's bona fide 
purchaser status. 
In order to claim bona fide purchaser status, a purchaser 
must provide valuable consideration,^ and must obtain its 
interest in the property in good faith. Pender v. Dowse, 265 
P.2d 644, 653 (Utah 1954) . A purchase is not made with good 
faith if it is made with notice of a prior adverse interest in 
the property. I_d. Such notice may be either actual or 
constructive. Constructive notice occurs "when circumstances 
arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to 
require further inquiry on his part." Meyer General American 
Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Utah 1977). As a general rule, the 
docketing of a judgment operates as constructive notice of the 
existence thereof. 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, Section 
664. 
bIn the present case, the property was listed for 
$265,000.00 at the time that Baldwins commenced negotions with 
Woods for the purchase of the property. According to 
Mr. Baldwin, "Willard Wood mentioned he was under some financial 
duress, and was willing to take a lower price on the home." 
(Baldwin Depo., page 5.) As consideration for the property, 
Baldwins paid Woods $57,024.33, assumed a first mortgage to 
Equitable Life Insurance Company in the amount of $25,780.00, and 
assumed the Woods1 obligation to Kofoeds under the May 15, 1979 
Uniform Real Estate Contract, in the amount of $121,695.67, for 
a total purchase price of $204,500.00. (R. 153; Wood Depo., page 
22.) While Mr. Baldwin considered this to be a "very good deal" 
(Baldwin Depo., page 21), it does not appear to be grossly 
inadequate consideration. However, considering that Burton's 
judgment against Mr. Wood is only in the amount of $4,323.73 
(R. 240), Baldwins1 purchase price may or may not reflect a 
discount for the Burton judgment. 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 78-22-1 states: 
From the time the judgment of the district court 
or circuit court is docketed and filed in the office of 
the clerk of the district court of the county it 
becomes a lien upon all the real property of the 
judgment debtor, not exempt from execution, in the 
county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him 
at the time or by him thereafter acquired during the 
existence of said lien. A transcript of judgment 
rendered in a district court or circuit court of this 
state, in any county thereof, may be filed and docketed 
in the office of the clerk of the district court of any 
other county, and when so filed and docketed it shall 
have, for purposes of lien and enforcement, the same 
force and effect as a judgment entered in the district 
court in such county. The lien shall continue for 
eight years unless the judgment is previously satisfied 
or unless the enforcement of the judgment is stayed on 
appeal by the execution of a sufficient undertaking as 
provided by law, in which case the lien of the judgment 
ceases. 
Under this section, a judgment automatically becomes a lien 
upon all non-exempt real property of the judgment debtor at the 
time it is docketed, and the judgment creditor's right to such 
lien is unconditional and is not subject to alteration by a court 
on equitable grounds. Taylor Nat 11, Inc. v. Jensen 
Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150, 155 (Utah 1982). The statute 
contains no exception for bona fide purchasers, nor is such an 
exception necessary, because judgment indexes afford ready access 
to information regarding judgment liens to prospective purchasers 
of real property, and purchasers who fail to inspect such 
records do so at their own peril. See generally 46 Am.Jur.2d, 
Judgments, Sections 155, 160. 
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Even if the docketing of Burton's judgment did not in itself 
create constructive notice of Burton's judgment lien, substantial 
evidence was presented to the District Court that Baldwins had 
cictual notice of Burton's judgment lien at the time they 
purchased the property. First and foremost, it appears that 
Baldwin's title agent, Western States, had actual knowledge of 
the Burton lien at the time that it issued its title report to 
Baldwins, but omitted any reference to the lien within its Title 
Report for reasons that its agents do not recall. (R. 089-091, 
110, 138.) 
It is well settled that a principal is chargeable with and 
bound by notice which her agent receives while the agent is 
acting within the scope of his authority, and which is in 
reference to a matter over which his authority extends. 77 
Am.Jur.2d, Vendor and Purchaser, 654. Western States' failure to 
discover or disclose Burton's judgment lien might give rise to a 
cause of action by Baldwins against Western States,7 but it is no 
defense to Burton's lien. 
Evidence was also presented to the District Court that 
Baldwins personally had at least constructive notice of the 
fraudulent nature of their September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed from 
Woods. First, inasmuch as the May 1, 1980 Special Warranty Deed 
^See e.g., Kiniskie v. Archway Motel, Inc., 586 P.2d 502 
(Wash. App. 1969). 
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from Mr. Wood to Mrs. Wood was of record, Baldwins had 
constructive knowledge of that instrument, including its 
recitation of "other good and valuable consideration" and had the 
same obligation as Burtons (if any) to inquire as to the reason 
for the conveyance and the nature of the consideration. In fact, 
Baldwins have stated that the reason for Mr. Wood's signing of 
the September 30, 1981 Warranty Deed was that Mr. Wood appeared 
to have "some naked interest of record" in the property by virtue 
of his having signed the September 30, 1981 Trust Deed to 
Kofoeds. (R. 410, 413.) Further, Mr. Wood has stated that his 
reason for signing the Warranty Deed to Baldwins was that he 
thought he still had an interest in the property, notwithstanding 
his prior conveyance to Mrs. Wood. (R. 071.) Therefore, it 
appears that Baldwins were aware of the conveyance from Mr. Wood 
to Mrs. Wood at the time of their purchase, and of the fact that 
there was some question as to the validity of that conveyance. 
Baldwins were expressly notified by Mr. Wood that he was 
experiencing financial difficulties at the time of the purchase. 
(Baldwin Depo., page 5.) There is also a question as to the 
reason for Woods1 execution of the September 30, 19 81 Trust Deed 
to Kofoeds, since Woods presumably had no interest in the 
property after executing their Warranty Deed to Baldwins. 
Finally, even if Baldwins were bona fide purchasers at the 
time of their initial purchase of the property, they have 
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subsequen t ly l o s t t h a t s t a t u s . Baldwins i n t e r e s t under the 
September 3 0, 1981 Warranty Deed from Wo^d was e x t i n g u i s h e d 
through foreclosure of Kofoed's September 30, 1981 Trust Deed on 
June 10, 1987 (R. 3 68) . T i t l e to the property was subsequently 
r e tu rned to Baldwin by Qui t -Cla im Deed da ted June 22, 1988. 
(R. 380.) Baldwin received such property by way of a g i f t from 
Mr. Ba ldwin ' s employer (Baldwin Depo., pages 28-30). Baldwin 
knew of B u r t o n ' s l i e n a t t h e t ime t h a t she r e c e i v e d t h e 
Qui t -Claim Deed, and a l s o provided no c o n s i d e r a t i o n for the 
Deed. Therefore, she had no claim to bona ^ide purchaser s t a t u s 
a t the t ime t h a t the D i s t r i c t Court e n t e r e d i t s Memorandum 
Dec i s ion .8 The i n t e r e s t which Baldwins a s s e r t in t h i s case 
i s not the i n t e r e s t which they received pursuant to the September 
30, 19 81 Warranty Deed from Woods, but the i n t e r e s t of Kofoeds 
within t h e i r September 30, 1981 Trust Deed from Woods (R. 235) . 
^Baldwins commenced t h i s act ion on May 12, 1987, a t which 
time Badwins' claimed i n t e r e s t w i t h i n the p r o p e r t y was under 
t h e i r S e p t e m b e r 3 0 , 1981 W a r r a n t y Deed from Woods . 
( In te res t ing ly , the o r ig ina l Complaint f i l ed by Baldwins named as 
P l a i n t i f f s "Linda Baldwin and Gregory Blake Baldwin," even though 
Mr. Baldwin purported to convey a l l of h i s i n t e r e s t w i t h i n the 
property to Mrs. Baldwin by Quit-Claim Deed on December 21, 1982 
(R. 340) . That i n t e r e s t of the Baldwin? was s u b s e q u e n t l y 
f o r e c l o s e d on June 10, 1987, as d e s c r i b e d in t h e t e x t . 
Therefore, Baldwins' i n t e r e s t in the property as of the date of 
the D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s Memorandum Decis ion was l imited to tha t 
which had been r e c o n v e y e d t o Mrs . Baldwin and t h e Lynda 
C. Baldwin T r u s t on O c t o b e r 7 , 1987 a*nd June 2 3 , 1988, 
r e s p e c t i v e l y . The named P l a i n t i f f w i t h i n Ba ldwin ' s Amended 
Complaint dated January 3, 1989 i s "Lynda C. Baldwin . . . in her 
name on behalf of the Lynda Baldwin Trus t . " [sic] 
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There is no evidence in the record as to what, if any, knowledge 
Kofoeds had, or of any inquiry which Kofoeds made, concerning 
Burton's j udgment 1ien. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
AWARDING BALDWINS ATTORNEY'S FEES AS DAMAGES 
The sole item of damages which was awarded to Baldwins by 
the District Court consisted of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-two and 66/100 Dollars ($7,827.66) "representing payment 
for attorney's fees and related damages incurred by plaintiff in 
this matter . . • ." (R. 668.) The District Court did not 
indicate the legal basis for its award of Baldwin's attorney's 
fees within either its Judgment or within its May 25, 1989 
Memorandum Decision. The sole basis alleged within Baldwin's 
Amended Complaint for an award of attorney's fees was under Utah 
Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 for a bad faith action or 
defense. Therefore, it is conceivable that the District Court's 
award of attorney's fees was (a) pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-27-56; (b) for slander of title; or (c) for wrongful 
execution. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56(1) allows a prevailing 
party reasonable attorney's fees only where the Court determines 
that the action or defense "was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith . . . ." Recovery under the statute 
requires both that the action or defense be without merit, and 
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brought in subjective bad faith. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 
781 P.2d 414, 421 (Utah 1989); Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 
(Utah 1983). Neither of these elements exist in the present 
case. The argument herein demonstrates that this case poses 
several complex legal and factual issues, the merits of which 
cannot be easily determined. Regarding burton's subjective 
intent, there is absolutely no evidence in the record of any 
malice or unprofessional conduct on the part of Burtons toward 
Baldwins, Burton's execution upon the property was induced by 
Burton Sr.'s receipt of a Notice of Default on the Lauri Kay 
property during the spring of 1986, which indicated that 
Baldwin's interest in the property was about to be foreclosed 
upon. (R. 047.) Burton, Sr. subsequently obtained a foreclosure 
report, dated May 8, 1986, which indicated that Burton's judgment 
lien had attached to the property prior to Kofoeds1 September 30, 
1981 Trust Deed. Burtons then proceeded to execute upon the 
property, as would any reasonable creditor under the 
circumstances. 
In Utah, for one to be liable for slander of title, he must 
publish matter which is untrue and disparaging to another's 
interest in property. Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 664 (Utah 
1954) . In the present case, Burtons did not publish anything 
that was untrue: They had a judgment against Mr. Wood which was 
apparently attached to the property at the time of Woods' 
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conveyance to Baldwins. Baldwins were clearly "successors-
in-interest" to Woods, whether or not Baldwins were bona fide 
purchasers or the conveyance from Woods was fraudulent. Although 
Pender v. Dowse implies that attorney's fees may at times be 
appropriate, in slander of title actions (Cf. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Libel 
and Slander, Section 550), the present case involves no facts 
which would warrant an assessment of attorney's fees against 
Burtons on such theory. 
Attorney's fees have sometimes been awarded as damages in 
cases involving wrongful executions. Coggins v Wright, 526 P.2d 
741 (Ariz. App. 1974); 30 Am.Jur.2d, Executions, Section 763. 
However, such damages are generally allowed only when the party 
performing the execution has acted in bad faith. Peterson 
v. Montana Bank of Bozeman, 657 P.2d 673, 681 (Mont. 1984). 
Accordingly, a party is not liable for a wrongful execution where 
the execution is caused by the misconduct of another person, such 
as the execution officer, Foley v. Audit Services, Inc., 693 P.2d 
528, 531 (Mont. 1985), or where the execution results from an 
erroneously entered judgment, Schuman v. Wallace, 104 P.2d 432 
(Okl. 1940). 
In the present case, there is no evidence of bad faith on 
the part of Burtons. Any error in the execution was caused, not 
by Burtons, but by Woods' and Baldwins' conduct in acting as 
through Mr. Wood had an interest in the property. 
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Baldwin should not have been awarded damages against Burtons 
for the additional reason that Burton's execution upon the 
property caused no damage to Baldwin. At the time of Burton's 
execution, the assignee of the Kofoed Trust Deed had already 
issued a Notice of Default upon the property and the property was 
subsequently foreclosed upon through a Trustee's Sale on June 10, 
1987. Therefore, at the time of Burton's execution, Baldwins 
were in default, and were about to lose their interest in the 
property in any event. Baldwins have subsequently regained an 
interest in the property and have asserted that interest as the 
successor-in-interest to the Kofoed1s Trust Deed. However, 
Kofoeds were not the owners of the property at the time of 
Burton's execution, and any conflict between the interests of 
Burtons and Kofoeds (now Baldwin) constitutes a conflict as to 
lien priority, not a wrongful execution. 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED 
IN AWARDING BALDWIN'S PARALEGAL COSTS 
Burton's argued within the preceding Point IV hereof that 
the District Court should not have awarded Baldwin's attorney's 
fees in this case. However, even if Baldwin was entitled to her 
attorney's fees, the District Court erred in awarding Baldwin 
over Four Thousand Dollars ($4,000.00) in "paralegal costs." 
The Affidavit of attorney's fees, which was filed by 
Baldwin's attorney in the District Court set forth, inter alia, 
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the amount of Three Thousand One Hundred Ninety- two Do l l a r s 
($3,192 •00) in a t t o r n e y ' s fees , Two Hundred F o r t y - f i v e D o l l a r s 
($245.00) in " s e c r e t a r i a l fees" and Nine Thousand One Hundred 
Ninety-five and 19/100 Dollars ($9,195.19) in "paralegal c o s t s . " 
(R. 643.) At tached to s a i d A f f i d a v i t i s a f i f t een (15) page 
b i l l i n g statement from "Paul H. Richins & Company I n c . , " which 
p u r p o r t s t o i t e m i z e t h e s a i d Nine Thousand One Hundred 
Ninety-five and 19/100 Dollars ($9,195.19) in p a r a l e g a l c o s t s . 
(R. 644-658.) 
Burton filed a timely objection to Baldwin's proposed 
attorney's fees and costs (R. 659-662) in which Burtons argued, 
inter alia, that Baldwin's claims for "secretarial fees" and 
"paralegal costs" were not recoverable under Utah law. 
The District Court held a hearing upon Baldwin's proposed 
attorney's fees and costs on May 14, 1990. The District Court 
subsequently issued its Judgment, dated June 4, 1990, which 
awarded Baldwin a total of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred 
Seventy-two and 66/100 Dollars ($7,872.66) in attorney's fees and 
"related damages." (R. 668.) Although the District Court did 
not specify the portion of its award which related to secretarial 
fees and paralegal costs, inasmuch as the total amount of 
attorney's fees and undisputed costs claimed by Baldwins amounted 
to only Three Thousand Two Hundred Seventy-five and 06/100 
Dollars ($3,275.06), the balance of Four Thousand Five Hundred 
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N i n e t y - s e v e n and 60/100 D o l l a r s ($4 r597.60) must have been 
awarded for s e c r e t a r i a l fees and/or para legal c o s t s . 
The Utah Supreme Court has not s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed the 
issue of whether or to what e x t e n t s e c r e t a r i a l and p a r a l e g a l 
expenses are recoverable . Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s are much divided 
on t h i s i s sue . Some cou r t s have he ld t h a t such expenses a r e 
n o t r e c o v e r a b l e . L e m o i n e v . C o o n e y , 414 S . 2 d 391 
( F l a . App . 1 9 8 7 ) ? I n r e T r u s t of Brown, 517 A.2d 893 
(N.J. Super. 1986) . The reasoning in t h e s e d e c i s i o n s i s t h a t 
such expenses "are a n e c e s s a r y p a r t or adjunct of a properly 
equ ipped l a w y e r ' s o f f i c e , " which a r e i n c l u d e d w i t h i n an 
a t t o r n e y ' s h o u r l y f e e , and a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o s e p a r a t e 
compensation. Levy v . S ta te , 420 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1979). 
Conversely, several Courts have held tha t such expenses are 
r e c o v e r a b l e . Lea Co. v . North Caro l ina Bd. of T r a n s p . , 374 
S.E.2d 868 (N.C. 1989); Multi-moto v . ITT Commercial Finance, 806 
S.W.2d 560 (Tex. App. 1991); Aires v . Palmer Johnson, I n c . , 735 
P.2d 1373 (Ariz. App. 1987); Newport v . Newport, 759 S.W.2d 630 
(Mo. App. 1988).^ The r a t i ona l e behind these cases i s tha t the 
^In Alaska, p a r a l e g a l fees are recoverable as an item of 
cos t s , pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 79(b) . Paralegal fees are 
rout ine ly allowed by the Federal Courts in claims brought under 
federal s t a t u t e s which provide for an award of a t t o r n e y ' s f ees . 
Hawkins v . A n h e u s e r - B u s c h , 697 F .2d 810 (8 th C i r . 1983); 
S e b a s t i a n v . Texas D e p t . of C o r r e c t i o n s , 558 F .Supp . 507 
(Dist . Tex. 1983). 
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use of paralegals may result in savings to clients and lower 
overall fee awards. Lea Co. v. North Carolina Bd. of Transp., 
374 S.E.2d at 871. 
Utah has traditionally adhered to a strict application of 
the "American Ruler" whereby parties are required to bear their 
own legal expenses unless an award of attorney's fees or costs is 
expressly allowed by statute or contract. Dyson v. Aviation 
Office, 593 P.2d 143 (Ut. 1979); Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834 
(Ut. 1989) . Any benefit in reduced legal expenses which can be 
achieved through the use of paralegals is not dependent upon the 
recoverability of such expenses from the opposing party. In 
fact, as the present case demonstrates, allowing recovery of 
paralegal fees may increase the costs of litigation and the 
amount of attorney's fee awards. 
Even if the Court should determine that paralegal fees are 
recoverable in some instances, the paralegal fees claimed by 
Plaintiff in the present case should be disallowed. The Courts 
which have allowed recovery of paralegal fees have uniformly 
allowed such fees as an adjunct of attorney's fees, rather than 
as an item of costs. This distinction is not merely semantic: 
Treating paralegal expenses as an item of attorney's fees insures 
that such expenses are related to legal services and are 
performed under the auspices of an attorney. As the Court stated 
in Multi-moto v. ITT Commercial Finance, 806 S.W.2d at 570: 
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A party may separately assess and include in the 
award of attorney's fees compensation for a legal 
assistant if that assistant performs work traditionally 
done by an attorney. In order to recover such amounts, 
the evidence must establish: (1) the qualifications of 
the legal assistant to perform substantive legal work; 
(2) that the legal assistant performed substantive 
legal work under the direction and supervision of an 
attorney; (3) the nature of the legal work performed; 
(4) the legal assistant's hourly rate; and (5) the 
number of hours expended by the legal assistant. 
(Citations deleted.) 
In the present case, not only have the factors referred to 
in Multi-moto not been set forth, it positively appears from the 
record that Mr. Richins largely operated outside of the control 
of Baldwin's attorney, prepared an independent billing statement 
according to Mr. Richins' own methods and disbursed his own 
costs. Allowing paralegal costs in the present case would 
encourage paralegals to act outside of the direction or control 
of a licensed attorney, in potential violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-51-25. 
POINT VI 
BURTON'S LIEN WAS NOT 
AFFECTED BY WOODS' DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY 
Baldwins argued at length in the District Court that 
Burton's judgment lien was rendered void by Woods' discharge in 
bankruptcy on December 15, 1983. (R. 474-475, 509-512.) 
Although the District Court mentioned Woods' bankruptcy in its 
May 25, 1989 Memorandum Decision (R. 577), the District Court 
made no express determination of the issue. 
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11 U.S.C. Section 524 states in part: 
(a) A discharge in a case under this title -
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to 
the extent that such judgment is a determination of the 
personal liability of the debtor with respect to any 
debt discharged under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228 or 
13 2 8 of this title, whether or not discharge of such 
debt is waived; 
This section expressly voids judgments only to the extent 
that they involve "the personal liability of the debtor." In the 
present case, Burton's judgment lien was upon the property, which 
passed to Baldwins upon Wood's execution of the September 30, 
1981 Warranty Deed. After that time, Burton's lien was never an 
obligation of Woods, personal or otherwise. Burton's execution 
upon the property had no effect whatsoever upon Woods. 
11 U.S.C. Section 506(d) states: 
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against 
the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such 
lien is void unless -
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 
502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or 
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due 
only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of 
such claim under section 501 of this title. 
This provision expressly excludes from discharge liens which 
have not been made a part of the bankruptcy proceeding, either by 
the filing of a proof of claim or by being made an allowed 
secured claim. The legislative history of Section 506(d) states: 
Subsection (d) permits liens to pass through the 
bankruptcy case unaffected. However, if a party in 
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interest requests the court to determine and allow or 
disallow the claim secured by the lien under section 
502 and the claim is not allowed, then the lien is void 
to the extent that the claim is not allowed. The 
voiding provision does not apply to claims disallowed 
only under section 502(e), which requires disallowance 
of certain claims against the debtor by a codebtor, 
surety,, or guarantor for contribution or 
reimbursement. 
[House Report 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 357 (1977); 
cf. Senate Report No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 68 
(1978) .] 
In Matter of Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1984), a secured 
creditor filed its proof of claim two (2) months after the 
deadline for filing claims had elapsed. The bankruptcy judge 
disallowed the claim because it was late, and further declared 
that the plaintiff's lien was extinguished. The Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the bankruptcy judge, 
to the extent that it invalidated the plaintiff's lien. In so 
doing, the Court stated: 
A long line of cases . . . allows a creditor with 
a loan secured by a lien on the assets of a debtor who 
becomes bankrupt before the loan is repaid to ignore 
the bankruptcy proceeding and look to the lien for the 
satisfaction of the debt. (Citations deleted.) 
One of the "long line of cases" cited in Matter of Tarnow is 
De Laney v. City and County of Denver, 185 F.2d 246 (10th 
Cir. 1950). In that case, the City of Denver, Colorado possessed 
tax liens upon certain personal property of the debtor, which 
personal property passed into the hands of a trustee in 
bankruptcy and was sold by him free of the liens. The City did 
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not file a notice of its tax liens and did not file a claim for 
taxes. However, following the sale of the personal property, the 
City filed a petition which asserted its liens against the 
proceeds from the sale of the personal property. In holding that 
the City was entitled to such proceeds, the Court stated at page 
251: 
A lien claimant may pursue one of three courses, 
(1) he may prove his claim as an unsecured claim and 
surrender his security; (2) he may prove his claim as a 
secured claim, give credit thereon for the value of the 
security, and share in the general assets as to the 
unsecured balance? or (3) he may not file a claim at 
all and rely solely upon his lien. 
Delaney merely confirms the rule which is expressed in 
Sections 524 and 506(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, that liens which 
are not made a part of the bankruptcy proceeding are not 
discharged. Application of this rule is particularly proper in 
the present case where Woods did not claim the property and had 
no apparent interest in the property at the time of the 
bankruptcy. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts, authorities and argument, 
Burtons pray that this Honorable Court reverse the decision of 
the District Court and Order that Burtons' Sheriff Deed be 
reinstated. In the alternative, should the Court determine that 
genuine issues of material fact preclude the entry of summary 
judgment for either party at this time, Burtons request that this 
case be remanded to the District Court for trial. 
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DATED this day of November, 1991. 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
DAVID H. SCHWOBE, Attorney f o ^ 
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- 47 -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LYNDA C. BALDWIN, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CIVIL NO. C-87-2971 
vs. : 
WILLARD D. WOOD, et al., : 
Defendant. : 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing on May 23, 1989. 
Both parties filed extensive Memoranda and Reply Memoranda of 
Points and Authorities which the Court reviewed prior to the 
hearing. Upon hearing argument the Court took the matter under 
advisement. The Court has now reviewed the argument of counsel, 
the points and authorities submitted by both parties, and herein 
renders its decision. 
On December 19, 1979, Kofoeds conveyed the property in 
question by warranty deed to Willard and Tonya Wood. On May 1, 
1980, Willard Wood conveyed to Tonya Wood by warranty deed his 
interest in the property. On June 9, 1981, defendant Burton 
obtained a Judgment against Willard Wood and one other. On 
September 30, 1981, Tonya Wood conveyed by warranty deed to 
Gregory and Lynda Baldwin the said property. (This warranty deed 
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was also signed by Willard Wood.) Also on September 30, 1981, 
Tonya Wood conveyed a trust deed to Kofoeds. (This trust deed 
was also signed by Willard Wood)• The Baldwins in purchasing 
the said property took the same subject to the primary mortgage 
with Equitable Life Assurance Company, and the aforementioned 
trust deed. 
Therefore, as of September 30, 1981, the Baldwins were 
owners of the property, subject to the underlying mortgage, the 
trust deed, and any liens of record. There were no liens of 
record against Tonya Wood, but there was the Burton Judgment lien 
of record against Willard Wood. 
The fact that Willard Wood also signed the warranty deed to 
Baldwins does not affect the title of the property",^  and is 
• insufficient to put Baldwins on notice to inquire further as to 
Willard Wood since Tonya^WoodT&was the only titled owner of 
record.' 
It is Burton's claim that the conveyance from Willard Wood 
to Tonya Wood was a fraudulent conveyance to defraud creditors, 
and therefore, nyll and void, and that his lien against the said 
property was valid. 
Baldwins claim that they were bona fide purchasers, 
purchasing the property from the only owner of record, Tonya 
Wood, and having no knowledge of the Judgment lien against 
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Willard Wood, therefore even if the conveyance was fraudulent, it 
doesn't affect their interest. 
Burton claims Baldwins had actual notice of his Judgment 
against Willard Wood because the title company, which they 
retained, had actual notice of the same. 
On April 21, 1983, ^ Willard Wood filed for bankruptcy, and 
listed Burton as a Judgment creditor. Willard Wood was 
subsequently discharged in bankruptcy. Burton maintains that his 
lien continued against the said property in spite of the said 
discharge. 
On August 6, 1986, Burton obtained a Writ of Execution 
ordering the sheriff or constable of Salt Lake County to collect 
his Judgment against Burton by levying upon and selling enough of 
the unexempted real estate of Willard D. Wood to satisfy the 
Judgment. At or near the same time, the Burtons delivered to the 
sheriff of Salt Lake County a praecipe- directing the sheriff to 
"levy on the right, title and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin 
and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard D. Wood." A 
-Notice of Real Estate Levy was recorded on August 12, 1986 
indicating that the sheriff on August 11, 1986 had levied upon 
all the right, title, claim and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin 
and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest of Willard Wood. A 
subsequent Notice of Sheriff's Sale indicated that all rights, 
title and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, 
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successors in interest of Willard D. Wood, to be sold on 
September 9, 1986. Proof of publication indicates notice of the 
real estate sale, again indicating the sale of the interest of 
Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, successors in interest 
of Willard D. Wood. The property sold for $8,760.10 to Burtons. 
The Certificate^of Sale at execution, dated September 12, 1986, 
indicates a verification that the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Department under the Execution issued out of the court sold the 
said property for $8,7 60.10, which was the highest bid made on 
the interest of "said defendants,11 and further added "all right, 
title and interest of Gregory Blake Baldwin and Lynda Baldwin, 
successors in interest of Willard D. Wood." The caption on this 
document indicates the parties to the lawsuit to be Max D. Burton 
and Emily A. Burton v. Clealon Mann and Willard D. Wood. The 
document indicates the Judgment was entered on June 9, 1981, the 
Execution issued August 6, 198 6, the property sold September 9, 
1986, and the civil number to be C-81-1568. The Baldwins were 
not parties to that action, and do not so appear as parties ir 
this certificate. 
Burtons only lien rights in this matter were against the 
interest in real estate owned bv his Judgment debtor, Willard 
Wood. Burton had no riaht tc the interest in real estate owned 
by the-Baldwins; and could not proceed against their rights. 
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If Burton believed that the Willard Wood conveyance to Tonya 
Wood was a fraudulent conveyance, made to defraud creditors, then 
he should have filed an action to have the said conveyance set 
aside so that his lien rights could be perfected. In such 
action, he would have named the Woods and the Baldwins as 
defendants, which would have given the Baldwins the right to 
litigate this issue, and.have their due process rights protected. 
However, such was never done. Title has remained at all times ini. 
the Baldwins and was in th^ Baldwins at the time Burton 
proceeded against the said property. 
This Court holds that the sheriff's sale was - void; The 
Baldwins were never Judgment debtors of Burton. Burton never had 
a legal right to the interests of the Baldwins. The only 
interest Burton had pursuant to his lien was a right to Willard 
Wood's owned interest in any real property. The Writ of 
Execution appears to be correct on its face. However, the 
Praecipe was ^ in.error, as were all subsequent documents leading 
up to the sale of the property. In essence, Burton has obtained 
Baldwins1 property by improperly prepared documents, all in 
violation of the rights of Baldwin. Therefore, the sheriff's 
deed is herein declared null and void, and set aside. 
Burton attempts to obliquely attack the Baldwins' interest 
in this real property by alleging that Baldwins were, in some 
manner, the successors in interest to Willard Wood. There^isTno 
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factual evidence whatsoever to remotely suggest the Baldwins are 
successors in*- interest to Willard Wood, subjecting them to 
liability on the Judgment Burton has against Willard Wood. 
Since the title of the property was and is clearly in Lynda 
Baldwin, the question remains whether or not Burton still has a, 
lien against the propertv Burton's lien is only to that 
property owned by Willard Wood, but Willard Wood conveyed the 
property to Tonya Wood on May 1, 1980, and Tonya Wood conveyed 
the property to the Baldwins on September 30, 1981. No* action 
has been filed to set that conveyance aside, and the *Burtons have* 
not so pled in this action The statute of limitations has!<run 
on bringing an action for fraudulent conveyance and, therefore, 
the Court rules as a matter of law that Willard Wood ^ has^no 
ownership interest in the property in question, and has not had 
such since conveying the same away in May of 198 0 and, therefore, 
Burtom^'can^festablish no riahts vto anv interest in the said* 
property^; 
The fact that Lynda Baldwin took no action to redeem the 
property after Burton's foreclosure sale is neither here nor 
there. Since the sale was void, there was nothing to redeem. 
It is noted that Willard Wood filed for bankruptcy on April 
21, 1983, and listed Burton as a Judgment creditor. 
Issues of fact remain as to damages Lynda Baldwin is 
entitled1,tot&tincluding attorney's fees, in regards to her having 
the^3bove^sheriff.»s salej/and-,. sheriffs. deed„set_:jaside. rhn«P 
•issues will be preserved for trial 
Based on the above, and for th* additional reasons as set 
forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and Reply 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed by the plaintiffs in 
this matter, plaintiff «s |M35mrofS»^ 
asiito^ decl'aring'^ the-^ sherff f,» s • sale^a^d^sffe^ffi^s'^de'ed^bs^urtb'n;. 
to,ibe(inull'^ andte,yoid^ and^ setiraside1?^ Th,e1':td.ssue,; of damages remains 
The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Burton is denied 
for the reasons stated above, and fojf the additional reasons set 
forth in plaintiff's Memorandum and Reply Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities filed in this matter. 
The attorney for the plaintiffs will prepare the appropriate 
Ordeir and Partial Summary Judgment. 
Dated this <^^ day of May, 1989. 
I Sri LeCmaurJL hJ--^)H5Sjr\ 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
2 4 - 2 2 1 FORESTRY AND FfRE CONTROL 
History I* 1961, eta 63, §20 
Repealing Clause 
Section 21 of Lavis 1961, eh 53 pro 
* Med "Sections 24 1 1, 24 1 2, 24 1 3, 24 1 
4, 2^1 5, 24 16 , 24 1 7, 24 1 8 , 24 1 9, 
24 1 10 24 1 11, 24 1 12, 24 1 13, 24 1 14, 
24 1 IS Utah Code Annotated 1053 are 
herehv repeated " 
24 2 21 Violation of law, rule, regulation, or proclamation a misde-
meanor—Any violation of any provisions of this chapter or of any rule, 
regulation, or proclamation issued by the board of forestry and fire control 
in consonance with this chapter shall be a misdemeanor 
History 0 1963, 24 2 21, enacted by I*. demeanor to violate any provision of the 
1973, ch. 37, § 1 state forestry and Are control law or any 
_, of the rules, regulations, or proclamations 
Title of Act.
 o f t n e b o a r d o f forestry and Are control — 
An act enacting section 24 2 21, Utah Laws 1973, ch 37 
Code Annotated 1953, making it a mis 
Effective Date 
Section 22 of Laws 1961, eh 53 pro 
vidnd "This net shall take effect July 1, 
1961 » 
Collateral References 
Woods and Forests*=»ll 
98 C J 8 Woods and Forests $ 8 
840 
TITLE 25 
FRAUD 
Chapter 1 Fraudulent Conveyances, 2r> 1 1 to 2~> 1 16 
2 Sale of Merchandise in Bulk 125 2 1 to 25 2 5 Repealed) 
3 Leases and Sales of Livestock [25 3 1 to 25 3 4 Repealed] 
4 Marketing Wool [25 4 1 to 25 4 3 Repealed] 
5 Statute of Frauds, 25 5 1 to 25 5 9 
CHAPTER 1 
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES 
Definitions 
Insolvency 
Fair consideration 
Convexnnces hv insolvent 
Convejances by persons in business. 
Conveyances by persons about to incur debts 
Conveyance to hinder, delay, defraud creditors 
When conveyance or assignment void 
Defrauding prior or subsequent purchasers—Fffect of notice at time 
of purchase 
( onveyanie of pnrtnership property 
Trust for grantor void 
"Creditors, "purchasers" includes heirs 
Bona fide purchasers not affected 
8nles without change of possession 
Rights of creditors with matured claims 
Rights of creditors with claims not matured 
25-1-1. Definitions —In this chapter 
"Assets" of a debtor means property not exempt from liability for Ins 
debts To the extent that anv property is liable for any debt of the debtor 
such property shall be included in Ins assets 
"Conveyance" includes every payment of money, assignment, release, 
transfer, lease, mortgage or pledge of tangible or intangible property, and 
also the creation of any lien or encumbrance 
"Creditor" is a person having any claim, whether matured or unma-
tured, liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent 
"Debt" includes any legal liability, whether matured or unmatured, 
liquidated or unliquidated, absolute, fixed or contingent 
History I* 1925, ch 42, § 1 , B B 1933 Columbia, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
k O 1943, 33-1 1 Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Comparable Provisions
 N c w ^ o r J ( | North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
States that have adopted the Uniform Pennsvhama, 8outh Dakota, Tennessee, 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act include A n Virgin Islands, Washington, Wisconsin 
rona, California, Delaware, District of nnd V*coming 
341 
Section 25 1 1 
25 1 2 
21 1 1 
25 1 4 
25 1 5 
25 1 6 
25 1 7 
25 1 8 
25 1 9 
25 1 10 
25 1 11 
25 1 12 
25 1 11 
25 M 4 
25 1 15 
25 1 16 
25-1-1 FRAUD 
Orosa Referenced 
Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor, 
70 6 511 
Fraudulent snie* by decedents, 76 11 13 
Homesteads generally, Title 28 
Statute of limitations, 7ft IS 26 (3) 
Uniform Commercial Code—Bulk Trace 
fere, 70A 6 101 et »eq 
Uniform Commercial Code—Sales, 70A 
2 lOt et eeq 
Construction and application 
This act has no application to fraudu 
lent ennveyanceg occurring prior to its 
passage Smith v Edwards, 81 U 244, 
17 P 2d 264 
Creditors 
Persons having claim in tort against 
grnntor which wns not reduced to judg 
incut nt time of alleged fraudulent con 
vevnnce held 'creditor" within meaning 
ot this section Zumga r Evans, 87 U 
108, 48 P 2d 513, 101 A L R 532, distln 
guished in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Exempt property 
In action to set aside conveyance by 
grnntor to daughters as fraudulent 
grnntor was not entitled to homestead 
exemption since he was not head of fam 
ily where his wife had died and children 
had nil attained majority and were not 
dependent upon him 7unign v Evans, 
87 U 1«>8, 48 P 2d 513, 101 A L R 532, 
distinguished in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
If judgment debtor's interest in cer 
tain land, which had been set aside to 
him ai homestead by bankruptcy court, 
wns greater in \a luo than at time of 
debtor's convejnnce of land to his wife 
without sufficient consideration which 
rendered debtor insolvent, Utah district 
court would be justified in setting pside 
such convevnnce as frnud on creditors, 
and judgment creditor thereupon could 
have execution issued and land could be 
sold in accordance with 28 1 14 and 28 1 
lr> Ostler Lund A 1 ivestock Co v Brough, 
111 U 116, 178 V 2d 911 
In determining whether judgment 
debtor's interest in land, sot aside to bint 
as homestead, had increased in value ao 
as to be worth more than his homestead 
exemption at time of debtor's conveyance 
of such land to his wife without sufficient 
consideration, so as to justify setting 
aside of such conveyance as fraud on 
creditors, trial court should have taken 
into consideration effect of wife's one 
third inchoate interest on market value 
of such land, for failure of which judg 
meat setting aside such conveyance was 
reversed and remanded for new trial Ost 
ler Land & Livestock Co v Brough, 111 
U 336, 178 P 2d 911 
Fraudulent mortgage 
A creditor with a matured claim mm 
have a mortgnge sot aside to the extent 
necessary to satisfy his claim under 25 1 
15 (1) where smh eonvej anre was made 
without fair consideration, defined in 25 1 
3, and would render the person making it 
insolvent Ned J Bowman Co v White, 
13 U (2d) 173, 169 P 2d 962 
I n t e n t 
In suit to set aside conveyance from 
husband to wife, no actunl fraudulent 
•n'ent *Ym be required, when there was 
no fair value or consideration given, and 
the effect of the transfer is to render 
the grantor insolvent Cnrdon v Harper, 
106 U 660, 151 T 2d 99, 154 A L R 
906 
Statute of limitations 
In suit by United States to recover 
taxes from taxpayer's transferee on theory 
that transfer of tnxpayer« property had 
been fraudulently made, government was 
bound by six year federal statute of llmi 
tntions rather than threo year Utah stat 
ute of limitations on actions based upon 
fraud or mistake, even though United 
States was pursuing its common law rem 
edv rather than its statutory remedy, rule 
that United 8tates is not bound by state 
statutes of limitation unless Congress so 
provides was controlling United States 
\ Decker, 241 F Supp 283 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent Conveyances€=>5 
37 C J S Fraudulent Conveyances § 5 
37 Am Jur 2d 691, Fraudulent Convey 
nnces § 1 
Conflict of laws as regards validity of 
fraudulent and preferential transfers and 
assignments, 111 A L R 787 
Creditors' right to attack as fraudulent 
a convevancc by third person to debtor's 
spouse, Ti A I R 2d 8 
future tort conveyance as fraudulent 
where made in contemplation of possibility 
for, 38 A L It Id 507 
Gift or other voluntary transfer by 
husband as fraud on wife, 64 A L R 466, 
49 A L R 2d 521 
Jurisdiction, and priority of its ex 
ercise, to require real property in another 
state or country to be applied in satis 
faction of debt (including the setting 
aside of a fraudulent conveyance thereof), 
144 A L R 646 
Right of creditors in respect of property 
gratuitousl} c<pveyed or transferred to a 
third person for alleged benefit of debtor, 
147 \ I R 1160 
Rights as between creditors of grnntor 
or transferor and those of grantee or 
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ti in«»ft r« t III n »| i i I of | mpei ly «i»n\ i \« d 
or tr iittfi rr< i| in frnud of creditors, 1 IK \ 
I It r»2«i 
Right to Ml node, for btnrfit nf lit irs 
nn I distributer*, n tonvcjnnro or transfer 
bv dciedent in fraud of his creditors, 148 
A I, it 210 
Rule donving iclicf to one who con 
v o i d his propertv to defraud his creditors 
at ippluable where the threatened claim 
which occ isioned the conveyance was paid 
or wns n t \ e r est iblished, 21 A I H 2d 
589 
g»atnt» nr rnl«» relating to preferences 
by insolvent debtor as applicable to now 
HMiirilx g i \ n in n nrw il of , t t r h i i i g r or 
HII t H( it lit ion for or nil I t t lon to , exist ing 
M i i i n t v U 2 \ 1 It H«»7 
htmrssioM, cs fah , or gift tax in rcspoct 
of or in nffictrd bv innvcvnnco or trnns 
h r rt storing to original ownir property 
transftired by him to defraud or dole) 
creditors, 108 A L R 1508 
Law Reviews 
I he Bankrupt's Spouse The Forgotten 
(huractir in the Bankruptcy Drama, 
Iniiathnn M Landers, 1974 Utah L Rev 
709, 722 
25-1 2 Inso lvency—A person is insolvent when the piesent fair salable 
\a lue of his assets is less than the amount that will bo icquired to satisfy 
his probable liability on his existing debts i s t !u\ become absolute and 
matured 
In determining whether a partnership is insolvent then shall be added 
to the partnership propeitv the ptcscnt Ian salable value of the separate 
assets of ta th general partner in oxi ess of ihe amount piohahlj sufficient 
to meet the tlaims of his s ip mite i n d i l o i s and also tin nmount of any 
unpaid subscription to the pirtnership of int It limited p u t n e r , provided, 
the present fair salable value of tin assets of such limited pnttner is prob-
ably sufficient to pay his debts, including su< h unpaid subscription 
History L.. 1926, ch 42, §2 , R 8 1933 Assignments 
& C 1943, 33 1 2. 
Cross Reference 
\ s to sett ing n*ide friudulent or vol 
mil ir) convpvinct s, stc 23 1 lr» 
Allegation of Insolvency 
Mlejption t h i t person is insolvent is 
t lkgi t ion of n conclusion, and such state 
incut must t»e implificd by allegations of 
fa» t as to nmouitl of monev required to 
piv his probiblc existing liabilities as 
they mature and of what fair salable 
\ iliac his jropirty is, nnd that such 
I ropcrtv IH iti«u0incnt to p i y his dtbls 
WIIHII should It spmfitri Smith v I d 
u ml* 81 V 244 17 1 2 1 204, disij proved 
in Zunigi v h i n s , S7 U l'»H, 48 I* 2d 
5 H , 101 \ I R 512, in which it was 
i ml to be sufficient to allege, in addition 
to mies«!irv m i t t i r s of inducement thnt 
deft nd nit nude the convovance, tint he 
V\T« thin insolvent or theicby rendered 
insolvent and th it convev tnre w is made 
without i nn«Mtl< r ition or without id( quite 
considention 
Mlegitton of insolvinrv in complaint 
in irt ion to ^ct aside t onveji ime held 
•sullicient i s agi inst contention that it 
w i s conclusion 7unig i v Fvans 8< U 
!*>« 48 P 2 1 513, 101 A L R 532, (lis 
tinguished in 102 U 12, 120 P 2d 1063 
Whether in assignment of an interest 
in mi estate was in good faith and not 
to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or 
w is made for such purpose, depends 
upon the facts and circumstances eur 
M»IItiding tin trans ictiou, as gathered 
fiom the tndgis of fraud present Boc 
i ilero v Pee, 102 U 12, 1 G I 2d 10G1 
Intent 
In suit to set aside convevance from 
husband to wife, no netu »1 fraudulent 
intont will be required, when thoro wns 
no fair vnluu or consider it ion givou, and 
tho effect of tho trinsfer is to render 
thn gruitor insolvent (anion v llnrper, 
KM, U •",to, lr>l P 2d '»", lr>4 A Ti R 
"06 
Proof of Insolvency 
Judgment and fruitless execution nro 
conclusive evidence of judgment dobtor's 
insolvent v Ogden State Bink v Barker, 
12 U 11 40 P 76% distinguished in 'it 
U 481, 182 P 3r>7 nnd 102 U 12, 120 
V 2d 1063 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent ConvevinrcsC=>')7<l) 
37 C 1 S Frnuduhnt Coiiviyim ca $ 10G 
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25 1-3 FRAUD 
Right of ittsohcnt to insure life for 
leneflt of rclntUes, 11 A 1/ R 51, 34 A 
L U 838 
History I* 1025, ch 42, § 3 , R 8 1933 
* 0 1043, 33-1 3 
Evidence 
Consideration clause in deed does not 
prove that deed was founded on valuable 
consideration, or on any consideration, 
ind hence where consideration expressed 
is one dollar, it may be shown that larger 
num nrtunlh was paid, and, where larger 
sum is expressed it may be shown that 
lesHer sum actually was paid Ogden State 
Rink v barker, 12 U 13 40 P 765, distin 
guished in 54 U 481 182 P 357 and 102 
U 12 126 P 2d 1063 
Fact that grnntor wns permitted to 
introduce evidence, tending to show that 
his deed to his sons was made because 
grantees had remained at home with him, 
had rendered value in work to him, and 
had agreed to stay with him, could not 
change effect and operation of only con 
sideration expressed in deed, namely ono 
dollar Ogden Bhite Bank v Barker, 12 IT 
H 40 V 76r», distinguished in 54 U 481, 
182 P 317 and 10" U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Consideration entirely different from 
that expressed in deed cannot be shown 
bj parol evidence Ogden Btnte Bank v 
Barker, 12 U 13 40 P 765, distinguished 
in 54 U 481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12, 
126 P 2d 1063 
Kecited consideration of $10 in deed 
from father to daughters wns not fair 
(onsiderntiou and expression "other good 
nnd %iluihle consideration" held to mean 
nothing in absence of extrinsic explana 
tory evidence Zuniga v Evans, 87 U 108, 
48 P 2d 513 101 A L R 532, distin 
guished in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Whether an assignment of an interest 
in an estate was in good faith and not to 
hin ler, delay or defraud creditors, or 
w as made for such purpose, depends upon 
the facta nnd circumstances surrounding 
the transaction, as gathered from the 
badges of fraud present Boccalero v Bee, 
102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Vnluiltnii of note* nnd accounts rc«eiv 
iblo in determining question of insolvency 
or bankruptcy, 133 A L U 1274 
' Fair equivalent" 
"Fair equivalent" used in this section 
means something other than "exact equiv 
nlcnt" or "full value," since "fair" modi 
fies nnd restricts "equivalent " Utah As 
sets Corp v Dooley Bros Assn , 02 U 
r
»77, 70 P 2d 738 
Fraudulent intent 
In suit to set aside conveyance from 
husband to wife, no actual fraudulent 
intent will be required, when there was 
no fair value or consideration given 
and the effect of the transfer is to render 
the grantor insolvent Cardon v Harper, 
106 U 560, 151 P 2d 09, 154 A L B 
006 
Fraudulent mortgage 
A creditor with a matured claim may 
have a mortgage, a conveyance under 
L"i 1 1, set nside to the extent necessary to 
satisfy his claim under 25 1 15 (1) where 
such con\o}nnce was made without con 
siderntion and would render the person 
making it insolvent Ned J B o * man Co 
v White, 13 U (2d) 173, 360 P 2d 062 
Parent and child 
Labor performed for parents by chil 
dren during their minority will not en 
title such children to compensation, so 
as to establish relation of debtor and 
creditor nnd permit parents lawfully to 
prefer children, convey their property to 
them, nnd thus plaee property out of 
reach of parents' creditors whose claims 
were in existence at time of deed's exe 
cution Ogden State Bank v Barker, 12 
U 13, 40 P 765, distinguished in 54 U 
481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 
1063 
Valuable consideration 
Where any promise or agreement of 
grantee sons to stay with grantor father 
was made at time when grantor was 
legally entitled to grantees' services with 
26 1 3 Fair consideration —Fair consideration is given for property, or 
obligation 
(1) When in exchange for snch property, or obligation, as a fair 
equivalent therefor, and m good faith, property is con\eycd or an ante 
cedent debt is satisfied , or, 
(2) When such property, or obligation, is received in good faith to 
secure a present advance or antecedent debt in amount not dispropor 
tionately small when compared with the value of the property or obliga-
tion obtained 
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out compensation su« h services would not 
constitute talunble consideration which 
would avail grantees as against grantor's 
creditors whose claims wero in existence 
at time of deed's execution Ogden State 
Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 P 705, dls 
tinguished in 54 U 481, 182 1 357, 102 
U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Notes, given for value, constitute \a lu 
nbln consideration for mortgage securing 
them Ogden State Bank v Barker, 12 U 
13, 40 P 765, distinguished In 54 XT 
481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 
1063 
Where there is a valuable conaidera 
tion which is stated to be fair, equivalent 
for, and not disproportionate to value of 
property conveyed, requirement as to 
allegations and proof of fraud Is more 
exacting Smith v Fdwards, 81 U 244, 
17 P 2d 264 
Whore wife owned substantial interest 
in joint bank account and husband exe 
cntcd note to wifo at her request upon 
withdrawing substantial sum from such 
account to invest in hazardous business, 
nnd when it became due husband exe 
cutcd renewal note secured by mortgage 
on undivided one half interest m prop 
eriy owned by them jointly, original note 
was supported by valuable consideration, 
and, hence, mortgage was not fraudulent 
as to creditors Williams v Peterson, 86 
U 526, 46 P 2d 6^ 74 
A debt barred by statute of limitations 
may nevertheless be consideration for 
assignment of interest in an estate, even 
as between close relations Boccalero v 
Bee, 102 U )2, 12* P 2d 1063 
Voluntary conveyance 
Deed, made for nominal consideration 
onl) , is mere \o\vntnry ennvoynnco and 
A old ns to gr«ntor's creditors whose claims 
wore in existence at time of its execution 
and who would, if it was to be given ef 
feet, be defrauded of their rights or hin 
dered or delayed in collecting their claims 
Ogden State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 
P 76% distinguished in 54 U 481, 182 
P 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
A con\eyance without consideration is 
voluntary, but not for that reason alone 
fraudulent Smith v Edwards, 81 U 244, 
17 P 2d 264 
An owner may convey exempt prop 
erty to anyone including his wife with 
out liming such convejnnco overthrown 
bv creditors, pro\ided ho makes the 
proper defense when sush transaction is 
annulled by or on behalf o( creditors 
Williama v Peterson, 86 II »>26, 46 P 2d 
674, Cardon v Harper, 106 U 560, 151 
P 2d 0»> 154 A L B 006 
Conveyance of property worth $14,000 
to 115,000, which netted only about $180 
a venr to party in satisfaction of pre 
existing debt of $10,000, held not a fraud 
ulent conveyance Utah Assets Corp v 
Dooley Bros Assn , 02 U 577, 70 P 2d 
738 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent Convo)ancea£=»70(l) 
37 C J 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 140 
37 Am Jur 2d 707, 708, Fraudulent 
f on\cyanco8 §J 18, 10 
Antecedent dtbt transaction in consid 
eratton of discharge of antecedent debt 
owed by one other than grantor as based 
on "fiir consideration' under Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 30 A L R 
2d 1200 
Assumption of mortgige as considers 
tion for conveyance attacked as in fraud 
of creditors 6 A L It 2d 270 
Attorney's fees conveyance or transfer 
in consideration of legal services, ren 
dered or to be rendered, ns fraudulent as 
against creditors, 45 A L R 2d 500 
Conveyance in consideration of future 
support as fraudulent against creditors, 2 
A L R 1438, 23 A L R 584 
Conveyance pursuant to antenuptial 
agreement as fraud on creditors, 41 A L 
R 1163 
FfTect of words "valuo received" or si mi 
lar words In written instrument, other 
than ncgoti iblo instrument or scnled in 
strunicut to create presumption or make 
prima facio case of consideration, 116 A 
L R 545 
Futuro tort conveyance ns fraudulent 
where mnde in contemplation of possible 
liability for future tort, 38 A L R 3d 
507 
Purchase of annuity by debtor as fraud 
on creditor, 154 A L R 727 
Transfer of property by debtor to cor 
poratlon, m consideration of its stock, as 
a fraud on creditors, 85 A L R 133 
Validity of mortgage securing unlimited 
future advances, 81 A L R 631 
26-1 4. Conveyances by insolvent —Every convej ance made, and every 
obligation incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby rendered, in-
solvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual intent, 
if the con\eyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair con 
Bidcration 
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History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 4 ; R. 8. 1933 
fc 0. 1943, 33 1-4. 
Application. 
Conveyance of proper! v north $14,000 
to * 15,000, which netted'only about f l80 
n year, to pnrly in satisfaction of pre-
existing drlit of fl0,000, held not n fraud-
ulrnt conveyance. Utah Assets Corp. v. 
Uooley Bros. AHSU., 92 U. 577, 70 P. 2d 
73.9. 
Conveyance between husband and wife. 
Conveyance by husband to wife for 
nominal consideration, hold, under fir-
cuiiistnnees, constructively fraudulent mid 
\oid as to existing rrcditors, without proof 
of nctun! fraud. Oustin v. Mathews, 25 U. 
163, 70 |». 402. 
Assignment by husband \o his wife of 
homo held not fraudulent conveyance 
whore widow established pood faith of her 
transaction by showing evidence of ad-
\ancrment to husband for construction of 
the house and for carrying on his business, 
l.und v. Howell, 02 U.*232, 67 P. 2d 215. 
hi suit to set nsido conveyance from 
husband to wife, no actual fraudulent 
intent will be required, when there was 
no fair value or consideration given, and 
the olTVct of the transfer is to render 
the grantor insolvent. Cardon v. Harper, 
106 IT. 500, 151 P. 2d 99, 154 A. L. R. 906. 
Vcrrce setting- aside fraudulent con-
veynnce by husband to wife can properly 
operate only to rescind the transfer of 
whatever title the husband conveyed to 
his wife. It ennnot disturb the wife's 
rights accruing by virtue of 75-1-1 and 75-
4 3. Cardon v. Harper, 106 U. 560, 151 P. 
*_M 99. 154 A. L. H. 906. 
Conveyances between relations. 
Conveyances between near relatives, cal 
cubited to pievent a creditor from realiz-
ing on his claim against one of such 
relative*, are subject to rigid scrutiny. 
I'axton v. Pnxton, 80 U. 540, 15 P. 2d 
1051, distinguished in 92 IT. 232, 67 P. 2d 
215 and 102 U. 12, 126 P. 2d lOfi.1. 
The mere fact that the transection is 
among close relatives does not necessarily 
moan that if is invalid, but the true facts 
ate subject to proof. Oivan v. Lambeth, 
10 U. (2d) 2*7, 351 P. 2d 959. 
A note and mortgage executed by son 
in good faith to secure a pre existing 
obligation which the son owed his father 
was not a fraudulent conveyance. Ned J. 
HUM man ('•» v. White, 13* IT. (2d) 173, 
3iW P. 2d 962. 
Conveyances between close relatives are 
subject to rigid scrutiny, but the fact that 
close relatives are involved does not ren-
tier the conveyance fraudulent. Ned J. 
Bowman Co. v. White, 13 U. (2d) 173, 
369 P. 2d 962. 
Evidence. 
Whether an assignment of an interest 
in an estate was in good faith and not to 
hinder, delay or defraud creditors, or 
was made for such purpose, depends upon 
the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the transaction, as gathered from the 
badges of fraud present. Boccalero v. 
Pee, 102 U. 12, 126 P. 2d 1063. 
There was sufficient evidence to war-
rant finding that conveyance and bill of 
sain were executed on the part of both 
the grnntor and grantee with actual intent 
to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, 
ami that said transaction was fraudu-
lent as to both present and future credi-
tors. Cardon v. Harper, 106 U. 560, 151 P. 
2d 99, 154 A. L. It. 906. 
In an action on notes executed by tho 
defendants and to establish n lien on prop-
erty conveyed by one of the defendants 
to his children, the evidence was sufficient 
to sustain the lower court's findings that 
the conveyances were not fraudulent and 
to sustain a judgment denying a lien. 
Civan v. Lambeth, 10 V. (2d) 287, 351 P. 
2d 959. 
Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as 
to creditors must be determined from the 
facts of each case and from the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction, keep-
ing in mind that the purpose of the 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act (25-1-1 to 
25 1-16) is not to prevent a debtor from 
securing his honest debt. Ned J. Bowman 
Co. v. Whito, 13 U. (2d) 173, 369 P. 2d 962. 
"Fair equivalent." 
"Fair equivalent" used in 25-1 3 means 
something other than "exact equivalent" 
or "full value," since "fair" modifies and 
restrict* "equivalent " Utah Assets Corp. 
v. Dooiov Bros. Assn., 92 U. 577, 70 P. 2d 
738. 
Mortgage as conveyance. 
A mortgage made without fair consid-
eration, which will render the person mak-
ing it insolvent, constitutes stntutory 
fraud, and the existence of a subjective 
intention to defraud is not required. Ned 
.1. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 U. (2d) 173, 
369 P. 2d 962. 
Preferences. 
Kven if preference, effected by debtor 
by way of mortgnge securing notes exe-
cuted for value, was given with fraudu-
lent design or with intent to hinder nnd 
delay judgment creditor in collecting his 
judgment, validity of mortgage would not 
be nfTected by such fact if neither trustee 
in mortgage nor owner of notes pnrticipat-
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ed in or had knowledge of fraud. Ogden 
Rtate Bank v. Barker, 12 U. 27, 40 P. 
769, citing Pet tit v. Parsons, 9 U. 223, 
33 P. 1038. The Ogden case has been dis-
tinguished in 54 U. 481, 182 P. 357 nnd 102 
XL 12, 126 P. 2d 1063. Tho Pettit esse 
has been distinguished in 10 U. 96, 37 P. 
242. 
Debtor hns right to prefer one creditor 
over another. Ogden 8tate Bank v. Barker, 
12 IJ. 27, 40 P. 769, distinguished in 54 
U. 481, 182 P. 357 nnd 102 U. 12, 126 P. 
2d 1063. 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveynnccs«J=»74(l). 
37 C.I.8. Fraudulent Conveyances § 163. 
37 Am. Jur. 2d 694 of seq., Fraudulent 
Conveyances § 5 el seq. 
Antenuptial agreement, conveyance pur-
suant to, as fraud on creditors, 41 A. L. B. 
1163. 
Right of insolvent to insure life for 
benofit of relatives, 31 A. L. R. 51, 34 
A. L. R. 838. 
Use of debtor's individual funds or prop-
erty for acquisition, improvement of, or 
discharge of liens on, property hold in es-
tate by entireties as a fraud upon credi-
tors, 7 A. L. R. 2d 1104. 
Validity and effect as against credi-
tors of change of beneficiary or assign-
ment of insurance policy from estate to 
individual, 106 A. L. It. 696. 
26-1-6. Conveyances by persons in business.—Every conveyance made 
without fnir consideration, when the person making it is engaged, or is 
nhout to engage, in a business or transaction for which the properly re-
maining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital, 
is fraudulent as to creditors, and as to other persons who become creditors 
during the continuance of such business or transaction, without regard 
to his actual intent. 
History: L. 1925, 
1933 & C. 1913, 33-1-5. 
ch. 42, § 6 ; R. 8. 
Collateral Referepces. 
Fraudulent ConreynnccsC=374(l). 
37 C..T.R. Fraudulent Conveyances § 163. 
Right of creditors or their representa-
tives to complain of voluntary transfer or 
pledge of corporate assets by corporation 
which subsequently becomes insolvent, 117 
A. L. R. 1263. 
25-1-6. Conveyances by persons about to incur debts.—-Every convey-
ance made, and every obligation incurred, without fair consideration, when 
the person making the conveyance or entering into the obligation intends 
to, or believes that he will, incur debts beyond bis ability to pay as they 
mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors. 
dored or to be rendered, ns fraudulent as 
against creditors, 45 A. L. R. 2d 500. 
Future tort, conveyance ns fraudulent 
where made in contemplation of possible 
liability for, 38 A. L. R. 3d 597. 
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment, 
to attack conveyance or transfer ns fraud-
ulent, 73 A. L. R. 2d 749. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 6 ; R. S. 1933 
fc O. 1943, 33-1-6. 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveyances«J=>74(l). 
37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 163. 
Attorney's fees: conveyance or transfer 
in consideration of legal services, ren-
25-1-7. Conveyance to binder, delay, defraud creditors.—-Every convey-
ance made, nnd every obligation incurred, with actual intent, as distin-
guished from intent, presumed in law, to hinder, delay or defraud either 
present or future creditors is fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors. 
History: L. 1925, ch. 42, § 7 ; R. S. 1933 Oross-Refsrence. 
& C. 1943, 33-1-7. Defrauding creditors as a misdemeanor, 
76 6 511. 
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Construction and application 
1 his section docs not applr where no 
question of fraud is rained b) the plead 
ings, nor anv e\nlence offered relating 
to such question 8keen v \ an 8ickle, 80 
U 419, 15 r 2d 344 
Conveyances between relations. 
The mere fact that the transaction Is 
among close relatives does not necessarily 
mean that it is invalid, but the true facts 
are subject to proof Givan v Lambeth, 
10 U (2d) 287, 351 P 2d 9V> 
A note and mortgage executed by son 
in good faith to secure a pre existing ob 
ligation which the son owed his father 
wns not a fraudulent conveyance Ned J 
How man Co v \N hite, 13 U (2d) 173, 369 
V 2d *>«)2 
Convtvnnces between close relatives arc 
subject to rigid s< rutmy but the fsct that 
clone relatives are involved does not render 
th« conveyance fraudulent Ned J Bow 
nuiu t o v White, H V (2d) 17% 369 P 
2d «!«2 
Conveyance to wife 
Where the debtors wife had both pro 
tided initial funds for purchasing real es 
tato and had held previously owned real 
estate in her mine, fact that property on 
which husband g creditors sought judgment 
lien had been transferred from husband to 
wife did not establish intent to defraud 
creditors Ihllstcad v Leavitt, 25 U (2d) 
82, 475 P 2d 1017 
Voluntary conveyance 
Fact that grantee in voluntary convey 
unco does not participate in any fraud 
against grantors existing creditors, or 
flint grantee accepts deed in good faith, 
without intent to defraud such creditors, 
will not relieve grantee from effect and 
operation of such conveyance Ogden 
State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 P 
761 distinguished in 54 U 481, 182 P 
1«>7 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Former rule was that voluntary eon 
vcvnncc, made by debtor who was in 
embarrassed financial circumstances was 
constructively fraudulent, and would be 
held void, a* to existing creditors with 
nut proof of actual fraud, and even 
though grantee had no knowledge of 
fraudulent intent on part of grantor Og 
den State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 
P 76">, distinguished in 54 U 481, 182 
V 357 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent Conveyances€=»24(2) 
37 C T 8 Fraudulent Convevances § 33 
17 Am Jnr 2d 696 et seq , Fraudulent 
tonvcv mccs § 6 et seq 
Admissibility of declarations of grantor 
or transferor on issue as to whether con 
veyniice or transfer was in fraud of credi 
tors, 83 A L It 1446 
Admissibility of testimony of transferee 
as to his knowledge, purpose, Intention 
or good faith on issue whether conveyance 
wns in fraud of transferor's croditors, 62 
A L B 2d 418 
Agreement by husband that wife shall 
receive proceeds of sale of homestead as 
fraud on his creditors, 6 A L It 574 
Attorney's fees conveyance or transfer 
in consideration of legal services, rendered 
or to be rendered, as fraudulent against 
creditors 45 A L It 2d 600 
Conveyance between third persons upon 
consideration furnished by debtor as with 
in nppbention of Fraudulent Conveyance 
Act, 01 A L R 741 
Conveyance or transfer hy stockholder 
as fraudulent as regards his liability as 
stockholder to creditors of corporation, 89 
A L It 751 
( reditors receipt of proceeds of convoy 
mice or transfer bv debtor as estopping 
him to claim that conveyance or transfer 
was fraudulent, 9 A L It 358 
Creditor's right to attack as fraudulent 
a conveyance by third person to debtor's 
spouse, 35 A L R 2d 8 
Den>ing relief to one who conveyed his 
proper!) to defraud his creditors as ap 
plimblc whtre the threatened claim which 
occiiHioncd the conveyance was paid or 
was never established, 21 A L R 2d 589 
Fact that the parties to a conveyance in 
fraud of creditors nro not in pari delicto 
as affecting the right of the party guilty 
of fraud to relief, 7 A L R 150 
Future tort conveyance as fraudulent 
where mi do in contemplation of possible 
liability for, 38 A L R 3d 507 
(•ift by husband as fraud on wife, 64 
A L R 466, 49 A L R 2d 521 
(lift of debtors services to third person 
as fraud on creditors, 28 A L R 1046 
Liens use of debtor's individual funds 
or property for acquisition, improvement 
of, or discharge of hens on, property 
held in estate by entireties as a fraud 
upon creditors, 7 A L R 2d 1104 
Mortgage assumption of mortgage as 
consideration for conveyance attacked as 
in fraud of creditors, 6 A L R 2d 270 
Principle which denies relief to party 
who has conveyed or transferred property 
in fraud of his creditors, as affected by 
execution, as part of, or as contemplated 
at time of, the fraudulent transaction, of 
reconveyance or retransfer of the property 
to him, 89 A L R 1166 
Priority of judgment over conveyance 
made after beginning of term but prior to 
rendition of judgment, 5 A L R 1072 
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Right iif grantee or transferee lo be 
reimbursed fur i \petiditur< s in pnvment 
of t sx i s or ciiiutuhrnncrR on properly 
where convevmice or lr»n*ter is in fraud 
of creditors, 8 A L It 627 
Right of grnntee, transferee or mort 
gngee in instrument fraudulent as to cred 
itors to protection to extent of considera 
tion paid by him, 70 A L 11 132 
Right of grantor or transferor or his 
privies lo attack conveyance or transfer 
made for purpose of evading taxation, 
118 A 1, R 1184 
Right of parent as against creditor or 
Honor to make gift to minor child of lat 
tor's own services, 44 A L R 876 
Tort claimant's right, prior to judgment, 
to attack conveyance or transfer as fraud 
ulcnt, 73 A L R 2d 749 
transfer of proporlv by debtor to cor 
porsfion, in consideration of its stock, as 
n fraud on creditors, 85 A L R 133 
Validity and effect as against creditors 
of change of beneficiary or assignment of 
insurance poliej from estate to individual, 
106 A I R 500 
Validity as against creditors of change 
of beneficiary of insuranco policy from 
estate to individual, 6 A L R 1178, 106 
A L R B96 
Validity as against creditors of trustee 
or one deriving his right from trustee, of 
conveyance or transfer to carry out terms 
of unenforceable parol trust, 64 A L It 
576 
Validity of assignment of future book 
accounts, 72 A L R 856 
26 1 8 When conveyance or assignment void —Every conveyance or 
assignment, in writing or otherwise, of any estate or interest in lands, or 
in goods or things in action, or of rents or profits issuing therefrom, and 
e\ery charge upon Innds, goods or things in action or upon the rents or 
profits thereof, made with the intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, 
or other persons, of their lawful suits, damages, forfeitures, debts or de 
mantis, and everv bond or other evidence of debt gi\cn, suits commenced, 
or decree or judgment suffered, with the like intent, as against the person 
hindered, delayed or defrauded shall be void 
est debts, or from doing equity and exact 
justice to all of his creditors by placing 
his means at their disposal Billings v 
Parsons, 17 U 22, 53 P 730 
History R 8 1868 & O L 1907, §2474, 
O L 1917, § 6 8 2 1 , R S 1933 * O 1943, 
33-1 8 
Compiler's Notes 
Analogous former statutes, Comp Laws 
1870, § 1017, 2 Comp 1 aw» 1888, § 28 IS 
Construction and application 
This section is substantially the same as 
13 Elir c •», and is merely declaratory 
of the principles of the common law 
United States v Late Corporation of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day 
8aints, 5 U 538, 18 P 35 
Under this section the assignment of 
the corporate property of the Church of 
Tcsns Christ of Latter Diy Saints, pend 
ing dissolution of that corporation by Act 
of Congress was held in fraud of the 
rights oft the government and void as to 
the receiver, the government being in 
eluded in the words ' other persons" 
United States v Late Corporation of 
Church of JCHUS Christ of Latter Day 
Ssnnts 5 U 538, 18 P 35 
Insolvency is not required to make this 
section operative Ogden State Bank v 
Marker, 12 U 13 40 P 765, distinguished 
in *54 U 481, 182 P 357 and 102 U 12, 
Assignments generally 
Under this section an assignment of 
property is not void which among other 
things provides that the assignees out of 
tho proceeds of "personal property" will 
pay, and thst assignees accept trust and 
agree to execute snme by disposing of the 
property and collecting the chosen in ac 
tion due assignor and applying proceeds to 
pnyment of debts It does not confer au 
thority to sell on credit 8precht v Par 
sons, 7 U 107, 25 P 730 
Rule that sale or assignment of chat 
tels, unaccompanied by chnnge of pos 
session, is fraudulent per se as to execu 
tion creditors of, or subsequent purchasers 
from, seller or assignor does not neces 
sanly apply to assignments for benefit of 
creditors, but long delay in taking pos 
session is circumstance from which fraud 
may be prima facie inferred Snyder v 
Murdock, 20 U 419, 59 P 91 
Conditional sales 
Assignment for benefit of creditors held 
126 P 2d 1061 void as to seller of personal property in 
Statute was not intended to prevent assignor's possession under contract of 
debtor from pa>mg or securing his hon conditional sale, condition of which was 
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tinptrfuimctl Kiiiri if ciupowertd aMigntc 
tn mil assigned propertv on credit C harks 
J ippmtott & t o v Hich, JO U 140, 56 P 
Evidence of fraud 
A primn facie case tlint property wan 
innvtved to son of one of the defendants 
with tuti tit to defrnud judgment creditors 
w is established by evidence indicating 
I nth nominal consideration for the prop 
crtv nnd defendants' indebtedness at time 
of conveyance Brimhall v Grow, 25 U 
(2il) 2«>8, 480 P 2d 731 
Extent of invalidity of assignment. 
An general rule, assignment which is 
f r uidnlent in fnct is void in toto W P 
Nobln Mercantile < o v Mt Pleasant 
1 quitnhlu Coop IiiHt, 12 U 213 42 P 
8l,<» distinguished in 1*> U 110, 47 P 604 
mid 18 IT 42 5r> P 77 
As general rule assignment which is 
\md in part is \oitl in its entirety \\ P 
Noble Mercantile Co v Mt Pleasant 
1 quit iblc Coop Inst 12 U 2 H 42 P 
Hl)(> distinguished m 15 U 110, 47 P 604 
and 18 V 42, r>"> P 77 
Homesteads 
A homestead ° »nnot be made subject 
of attack by a creditor upon ground that 
it wis sold or convened m fraud of such 
creditor Pivson Exch Sn\ Bnuk v Pict 
j«n, 63 I! 321, 225 P r»<»8, explained in 
80 U 2ri7, 42 P 2d 989 
Presumption of fraud 
Where grnntor was hcavilv indebted at 
time of his execution of voluntary con 
vojanee, inference n that conveyance wns 
fraudultntl) made for purpose of hinder 
nig ind delating grantors creditors Og 
dm State nank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 
P 70S, applying identical section in Comp 
I ins of 1888 distinguished in 54 U 481, 
182 P 3r»7 and 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1061 
Right of corporate directors to prefer 
themselves 
When eorpornti n h IH become insolvent 
and ihiindoiu d objects for which it was 
treated, its directors cannot, by volun 
tary deed of assignment prefer them 
selves, as corporate creditors, over other 
sut h treditors whose claims are equally 
meritorious R<» IS to setuie nd\ iiitagc 
eiver h l t e r l \ reason of directors' ofllcial 
positions nnd th« ir consequent snporior 
knowledge of corporation's affairs W P 
Noble Mercantile Co v Mt Pleasant 
Tquitable Co op Inst , 12 U 213, 42 P 
869, distinguished in 15 U 110, 47 P 
604 and 18 U 42, 55 P 77 
\N hen nsHignmcnt of property of cor 
porntion, which has become insolvent and 
abandoned objects for which it was ere 
nted contains fraudulent preferences in 
favor of directors as corporate creditors, 
such fact of itself indicates fraudulent, 
intent on directors' part W P Noble 
Mercantile Co \ Mt Pleasant Equitable 
Coop Inst 12 U 213, 42 P 869, distm 
guished in 15 U 110, 47 P 604 and 18 
U 42 55 P 77 
Fact t int directors assert t in t they 
hid no frnu lulent intent, when, after 
corporation had become insolvent, they 
made assignment of corporate property 
whn.lt constituted preference in their 
favor as corporate creditors, is imniatc 
rial as far as invalidity of assignment 
is concerned, since directors must be pre 
sumed to have intended probable conse 
quences of their act W P Noble Mcrcan 
tile Co v Mt Pleasant Fquitoble Coop 
Inst 12 V 213, 42 P 869, distinguished 
in 15 U 110, 47 P C04 and 18 U 42, 55 
P 77 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent ConvcvanccsC=>24(2) 
37 C-T 8 r rniidulent Conrejances § 23 
*• nforccibi l i t j , as between parties, of an 
executory agreement made in fraud of 
creditors, 172 A I, J{ 1121 
rxces i ive sccuntj for debt as affecting 
question of fraud upon creditors 138 A 
1 R 10r»l 
Priority of judgment over conveyance 
made after beginning ot term but prior to 
ren lition of judgment, 5 A L R 1072 
Hents and profits accountability nnd 
liability for rents and profits of gr intee 
of f r ludulentlj conveved real property, 
00 A h It 2d ri«>3 
Hight of wife or chi l l by virtue of right 
to support to maintain action to set aside 
convejance bj husband or parent as fraud 
uleitt, without reductng claim to judg 
ment, 164 A L U 524 
25 1 9 Defrauding prior or subsequent purchasers—Effect of notice at 
time of purchase—E%cr\ < on\e\itnte of any estate or interest m lands, or 
the rents or profits of lands, and e\cry charge upon lands, or the rents or 
profits thereof, made or created with intent to defraud prior or subsequent 
purchasers thereof for a valuable consideration shall be void as against 
such purchaser* But no such conveyance or charge shall he deemed 
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fraudulent in fax or of a subsequent purchaser who had actual oi construe 
ti\e notice thereof at the time of his pun base, unless it appears that the 
grantee in such conwnancc, or the person to be benefited by such charge, 
was privy to the fraud intended 
History R 8 1898 & O L 1907. §§ 2464, 
2465, O L. 1917, §§5814, 6816, R 8 1933 
4c O 1043, 33-1 0 
Compiler s Notes 
Analogous former statute, 2 Contp I aws 
1888, §2833 
Mortgagor remaining in possession 
Mortgage on stock of merchandise held 
fraudulent as to judgment creditor of 
mortgagor, where mortgagor remained in 
possession nf mortgaged proper! v and 
continued tn sell it in usual courso of 
hiiHiucHH pnrsu mt to mcrelj verbnl agree 
ment with mortgagee which agreement 
eonlt mpl itcd that mortgage was not to 
History R 8 1808 A C L 1007. § 2466, 
O L. 1017, §5816 R. 8 1933 * O 1943 
33 1 11 
Construction and application 
This section relates only to transfers 
of personal property not real property 
Genrv \ C n n , 70 U 268, 9 P 2d 396 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent Conv evauccsC=>lll 
37 V 3 8 r raudulent Conv ev ances § 219 
\bsolute conveyance or transfer with 
secret reservation as fraudulent per se 
as agnnst creditors, 68 A L R 306 
be paid on its due date but was to bo ex 
tended from time to time McKibbon r 
Hrighnm, 18 U 7S, ftS P 60 
Collateral References 
fraudulent Conv e y n n c c s C ^ l 
37 C J 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 286 
Grantor's continued possession ot land 
after execution of deed as notice of his 
claim adverse to title convened, 105 A 
L R 845 
1 cngth of period of possession beforo 
arrriuil of rights of perHon sought to be 
niTtctid b) notitc as affecting tho rulo 
regarding constructive notice from pos 
session of real property, 105 A L It 892 
TcVsorvntion to settlor of trust or other 
grantor of right to rovoke or to with 
draw securities or other property and 
substitute others as affecting validity as 
against creditors 92 A L R 282 
Validity as agaiust creditors of convey 
ance m trust for settlor for life with re 
nmnder to his appointees, 93 A L R 
1211 
Validity of trust created by nontesta 
mentary instrument reserving benefit to 
settlor for life with power of revocation, 
73 A L R 209, 32 A L R 2d 1270 
25 110 Conveyance of partnership property -—Ever} conusance of 
partnership property, ami e\cr} partnership obligation incurred, when the 
partnership is or will be therebv rendered insolvent is ftnudulcnt as to 
partnership creditors, if the conveyance is made or obligation is incurred, 
(1) To a partner, whether with or without a promise b\ him to pay 
partnership debts, or, 
(2) To a1 person not a partner without fair consideration to the part-
nership, as distinguished from consideration to the individual partners 
History I*. 1925. ch 42, § 8. R 8 1933 Rights ot partners when agreement is 
fc C 1943, 33 1 15 rescinded, 18 1 36 
Cross References Collateral References 
Preferences to limited partner, 48 2 13 Partnership<5=>180 
68 C T S Partnership § 180 
25111 Trust for grantor void—All deeds, gifts tonvevnnces, trans 
fcrs or assignments, verbal or written, of goods, t battels, or things in 
action made in trust for the use of the person making the same Rball be 
void as against the existing or subsequent creditors of such person 
351 
25-1-12 FRAUD 
25 1-12 "Creditor*," "purchasers" includes heirs —Every conveyance, 
charge, instrument or proceeding declared to be void by the provisions of 
this chapter as against creditors and purchasers shall be equally void as 
against the heirs, successors, personal representatives or assigns of such 
creditors or purchasers 
History R 8 1 8 9 8 * 0 L 1907, §2475, Collateral References 
0 L. 1917, §6822 , R 8 1933 ft 0 1943, Fraudulent Convcyances<8=^ 
33 1 12 37 C.J 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 4 
25 1 13 Bona flde purchasers not affected —The provisions of this 
chapter shall not be construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser 
for a valuable consideration, unless it appears that such purchaser had 
previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his immediate grnntor, or of 
the fraud rendering void the title of such grantor 
tors to protection to extent of considt ra 
tion paid by htm 70 A L II 112 
Right of grantee, or his prmes , to main 
tain suit or proceeding for affirmative re 
lief, where claim i i made or anticipated 
that conveyance was made with intention 
on part of grantor, but without actual 
fraud bj grantee, to defraud formers 
creditors, 128 A L R 1504 
Right of grantee or transferee to be 
reimbursed for expenditures in payment 
of taxes or encumbrances on property 
where conveyance or transfer is in fraud 
of creditors, 8 A L R 527 
Rights as between creditors of frandu 
lent grantor, where one or more of them, 
in payment of or as security for his debt, 
rccei>es deed or mortgage from fraudulent 
grantee, 114 A L R 406 
History R 8 1898 ft O I, 1907, §2476, 
O I* 1917, §6823, R 8 1933 ft O 1943, 
33 1 13 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent Convevanren<3=»102 
M r 1 fl Fraudulent Convejances § 201 
Necessity of participation by the 
grintee or transferee in the fraud of the 
grantor or transferor in order to avoid 
a \oluntnry convejance or transfer as 
against creditors 17 A L R 728 
Presumption and burden of proof as re 
gards good faith and consideration on 
part of purchaser or one taking encum 
hrnmc subsequent to unrecorded convey 
nice or encumbrance, 107 A L R 502 
Right of grantee, mortgagee or trans 
fcrec in instrument fraudulent as to credi 
25 1 14 Sales without change of possession —Every sale made bv a 
seller of goods or chattels in his possession or under his control, and 
c\ery assignment of goods and chattels, unless the same is accompanied 
by a deli\er\ within a reasonable time, and is followed by an actual and 
continued change of the possession of the things sold or assigned, shall 
he conclusive evidence of fraud as against the creditors of the seller or 
assignor, or subsequent purchasers in good faith The word "creditors" 
as used m this section shall be construed to include all persons who shall 
be creditors of the seller or assignor at any time while such goods and 
chattels shall remain in his possession or under his control 
plaintiff acquired all rights of such mort 
gagor therein, including right to invall 
date mortgage Volker Lbr Co v Utah 
3c Oregon Lbr Co, 45 U 603, 148 P 365, 
Ann Cat 1917D, 1158 
History R 8 1898 ft C L 1907, §2473, 
R 8 1933 ft O 1943, 33-1 14 
Compiler s Notes 
Analogous former statutes, Comp Laws 
1876, § 1016, 2 Comp l a w s 1888, §2837 
Assignee of prior claims 
Under this section, where plaintiff, after 
filing of chattel mortgage, secured assign 
ment of a claim against the mortgagor 
which had accrued previous to the filing, 
Badges of fraud 
Transaction of s i l e without delivery 
or chingo of possession of things sold, 
w i s fraudulent an against creditors of 
vendor so as to authorise granting of 
attachment Charleston Co op v A W 
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Alb ii K U r n Id IT ri7'», ICT P r>78, Ann 
l i i i I M I 4 P , 100J 
hlttn) hfidgtft of fraud nra net out in 
Boccnlcro v lice, 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 
1001 
Bona flde purchasers 
Convejance of homestead by debtor to 
wife and by her to third person for cash, 
mortgage to her, and assumption of bus 
l a n d s debt to nnother, also secured by 
mortgage given by purchaser, who sub 
scquently paid said assumed debt, where 
transactions were completed prior to any 
judgment against debtor husband, and 
purchaser from wife was unaware of this 
latter indebtedness, was not voidable as 
fraudulent Btnte Bank of Beaver County 
v Mortensen, 66 U 290, 241 P 1055 
Change of possession 
( hangc of possession must be actual 
and not merely constructive or colorable 
Tver, tt \ Brigham, 14 U 242, 47 P 75 
Posmsiion iinist be continuous in pur 
ehaiir and not merely delivery and sur 
rcnd« r bnck 1 \crott v Brigham, 14 U 
242 47 P 71 
After delivery of possession, vendee 
may appoint vendor to hold property for 
him as his trustee or agent, or may make 
htm his cmplojio, but such appointment 
or employment must be in good faith, and 
may bo regarded as suspicious circum 
stance and be considered by jury, with all 
of other evidence, in determining whether 
possession w i s taken and held in good 
fmth Lverctt v „Brigham, 14 U 242, 47 
P Ti 
Bale of machinery by corporation to 
newly orgini7cd operational subsidiary 
in good faith cannot be voided on behalf 
of one who became creditor after trans 
for, on ground that there was no change 
of possession and transaction, therefore, 
was fraudulent Boston Acme Mines De 
tttlopment Co v Clnwson, 66 U 103, 240 
P 105 
' Creditor" defined 
The term "creditor" includes all per 
sons who may have claims against mort 
gagor at any time while mortgaged goods 
and chattels remnin in his possession 
Volker Lbr Co v Utah A Oregon Lbr 
Co, 45 V 603, 148 P 365, Ann Cas. 
1Q17D, 1158, applying this section and 
9 1 1 (since repealed) dealing with requi 
sites for validity of a chattel mortgage 
Evidence 
In action for allegedly wrongful con 
\ersion of wool by defendant judgment 
creditor of owner, which owner had de 
Incrcd wool to plaintiffs in payment of 
debt, held that, although arrangement 
le tneen owner and plaintiffs for trans 
pnrtalinn of wool bj debtor of owner 
might he sdNpirioiift circumstance, it couid 
not be regarded, as matter of law, as 
conclusive evidence of fraud Everett v 
Brigham, 14 U 242 47 P 75 
In action for allegedly wrongful eon 
version of wool by defendant judgment 
creditor of owner, which owner had de 
livered wool to plaintiffs in payment of 
debt, held that, under evidence, questions 
of whether plaintiffs' subsequent posses 
sion of wool was actual or merely color 
able, and of whether it was continuous, 
were questions for jury Everett v 
Brigham, 14 U 242, 47 P TS 
Where a debtor in a cleaning business 
gave a bill of sale to plaintiff but kept 
and used the equipment involved and re 
ceived additional equipment from the 
plaintiff who retained title under a condi 
lional sales contract, the plaintiff was not 
entitled to a summary judgment in an 
action involving tho machinery since there 
was a disputed fact question as to notice 
to or knowledge of tho sale by defendant 
who had loaned money secured by chattel 
mortgages on the machinery Martin 
M ichinery v Btrevell Paterson Finance 
Co , 7 U (2d) 316, 324 P 2d 770 
History of section 
It will be noted that this section was 
taken from Comp Laws 1907, due to the 
fact that the last sentence was repealed 
by Comp Laws 1917, and waa restored 
in 1933 8ce Hansen v Daniels, 73 U 142, 
272 P 941 
Pleadings. 
Allegation in action to set aside con 
veyance that grtntor rem&lna in posses 
sion of land after its conveyance is an 
allegation of fact, and may or may not 
prove fraud Smith v Fdwnrds, 81 U 244, 
17 P 2d 264 
Presumptions and burden of proof 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, 
unaccompanied by change of possession, is 
fraudulent per se as to execution creditors 
of, or subsequent purchasers from, seller 
or assignor does not necessarily apply to 
assignments for benefit of creditors, but 
long delay in taking possession is circum 
stance from which fraud may be prima 
facie inferred Snyder v Murdock, 20 U 
419, 59 P 91 
Reasonable time for delivery 
Reasonable time should be allowed In 
which to make delivery White v Pease, 
15 U 170,49 P 416 
In action for conversion by judgment 
creditor and officers levying execution 
on gram claimed by plaintiff to have 
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I M n sold and It It \ « r* «f 11» In in l»3 ju lg 
tin lit fl» I tor, held thtt under ox idenei 
t|inMions of what win reasonable tint*1, 
niitlor nil of circumstunces of case, for 
milking delivery of grain, and of whether 
frnnsmhon between judgment debtor and 
plaintiff w IN fraudulent, were questions 
for jut) While v Tease, 15 U 170, 49 
J* 416 
I here It no fixed rule, which will gor 
< rn nil cases, as to what ia necessary 
to constitute such delivery and change 
of possession as are required b> this sec 
lion, but each case must be governed by 
its own particular facts and circam 
History L. 1925, ch 42, § 0 , B S 1933 
ft C 1943, 33 1 15 
Defenses 
Defend int in suit to set aside convey 
ance to his wife as fraudulent may in 
terpose defense that property is exempt 
from execution, and does not exceed in 
\nluo his maximum homestend, and upon 
submission of proof thoreof bv defend 
nut, court will be required to make find 
mgs with respect thereto Cardon v 
Harper, 106 U 560, 151 P 2d 99, 154 
A I R 906, following Williams v Peter 
«on, 80 U r>26, 46 P 2d 674 
—evidence 
When deed is attacked by creditors 
whose deininds were in existence at 
lime of its execution, and deed, if effec 
l ive, put it beyond power of grantor to 
meet his liabilities, burden of proof is 
on grantee, or those claiming under him, 
to show such consideration as will re 
lease deed from imputation that it is 
fraudulent as to such creditors, and was 
made to hinder and defraud them in col 
lectmg their demands Ogden Btnte Bank 
v Barker 12 U 11, 40 P 765, dutin 
guitfhed ut 54 U 481, 182 P 357 and 
102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1063 
Millie* HIIHI, v Mclornlck, 15 U 188, 40 
V W 
What constitutes delivery within rei 
sonnble tune, and actual and continued 
change of possession, are generally facta 
which depend largely on kind and nature 
of property, situation of parties, and cir 
cumstnnees peculiar to each case Blish v 
McComick, 15 U 188, 49 P 529 
Collateral References 
Fraudulent Conveyances<§=>135 
37 CJ-8 Fraudulent Conveyances §180 
37 Am. Jur 2d 731 et seq , Fraudulent 
Conveyances § 42 et seq 
So far as grantee's burden of proving 
consideration is concerned, deed's recital 
of consideration is not evidence of fact 
thereof as against creditors whose claims 
accrued prior to deed's execution Ogdcn 
State Bank v Barker, 12 U 13, 40 P 765, 
distinguished in 54 U 481, 182 P 357 
and 102 L 12, 126 P Cd 1063 
Jvidence in action to set aside con 
veynnce bv grantor of property of fair 
value of 13,250 for $10 and other valu 
able consideration to daughters, held to 
show that conveyance was fraudulent as 
to creditors Zuniga v Evans, 87 U 198, 
48 P 2d 513, 101 A L R 532, distin 
ginshed in 102 U 12, 126 P 2d 1061 
Garnishment proceeding 
Fact that pleadings in garnishment pro 
ceedings repealed that indebtedness sued 
upon was that of individuals and that 
those individuals had no account with 
garnishee bank, the only account being 
with corporation owned by individuals, 
did not make cause of action one, under 
this section, to set aside conveyance, and 
thus argument that court had never ob 
tamed jurisdiction of corporate defendant 
or of res since no service of summons 
was made upon corporation could not be 
maintained, the pleading sufficiently 
25 1 15 Rights of creditors with matured claims —Where a convey 
anec or obligation is fraudulent as to a creditor, audi creditor, uhen JIIH 
clnim hns matured, mn>, as against an\ person cx< cpt a purchaser for fair 
consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the tune of the purchase 
or one who litis dcn\ed title immediately or mediately from such a pur 
ihaser 
(1) Ua\c the comeyance set aside or obligation annulled to the ex-
tent necessary to satisfy his claim, or, 
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or lev> execution upon, 
the property conveyed 
A purchaser who without actual fraudulent intent has given less than 
a fair consideration for the comeyance or obligation ma> retain the prop-
erty or obligation as security for repayment 
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averred a *h mi f iitus it lion between tho 
nidi* idiuth nut tho cot porn t inn so that 
tlit.> should bo considered tin itj* litir«l for 
put post of g iiiushmcnt prot ccdmgs Mint 
\ Giroln 0 tl (2d) 22,317 P 2d 62 
Transfer of stock could be set nsldo as 
n fraudulent conveyance on motion in 
garnishment proietdmg, and it vvaa not 
accesstrj to (lie n separate action to oh 
linn such relief Tensi n v >ames, 10 U 
(Jtl) 423, 519 P 2d 236 
Presumptions and burden of proof 
As to claims arising after a convev 
njirn \n nuiiln mid placed upon record It 
is imperative that a creditor, beforo he 
entt set It aside must allege and prove 
that he w is misled bj some overt not 
into believing something different from 
what the retord shout d Binith v Id 
w ir.ln 81 V 21*, 17 V 2d 264 
\N hero gr iut ics were in possrssu rt of |Mimis(M purHimnt to duly r» cordt d dt t d 
tut I wire pti>mg tnxes thoreon it WHS 
uicunil cut upon plaintiffs in action to 
set iiMido convev nice, to allege and prove 
that grantees as such did certain acts 
which misled plaintiffs, or held themselves 
out in t way that misled plaintiffs and 
that plaintiffs had knowledge and relied 
thorcon Smith v Fdwnrds, 81 V 244, 17 
P 2d 264 
Purdcn of proof is not on plaintiff to 
show t int properly, alleged to have been 
fraudulently conveved, ia not exempt from 
execution ( irdon v Harper, 106 U 560, 
J rt 1 V 2d !>«», 1 r>4 A h R 906 
Setting aside conveyance, limitation ot ac-
tion 
Where action lo set istdo convev nnccs 
ctJttHid* r ttion for which was stated to bo 
out dollar tit 1 other good and villi 
title consideration, was not brought tin 
hi sevtii veirs after conveyances were 
made i nd recorded notion was barred 
under fornu r three vcur statute of linn 
tat tons suite discover} was made, or situ 
ttion was such as to furnish full oppor 
limit} for tlic discovery of fraud, if nnj 
existed snore than three venrs before 
bringing of the action, and limitation 
statute began to run from time reason 
nbl) prudent person would hnve invest! 
gttcd the other valuable consideration 
and discovered the falsity, if an) Smith 
v 1 dwards, 81 U 244, 17 P 2d 264, dis 
tinguished in 515 P 2d 1241 
A creditor with a matured claim may 
h i v e a mortgage, a conveyance under 
25 1 1, set aside under this section to the 
extent nccessnrv to satisfy his claim, 
where such conveyance was made without 
fair lonsideiation, defined in 25 1 3 , and 
would render the person making it insol 
v«iil Ntd ? I iowimt ivo v White, 13 1! 
(-M) 17 I If ) I I «iij 
—homesteid exemption 
If lodgment debtors interest in ccr 
t nit hind which had been set aside to 
him as homestead b> bankruptcy court, 
was greater in v tine than at time ot 
»h Mors conveyance of land to his wife 
without sufficient eoitsiderntion which 
rendcied debtor insolvent I'tnh district 
court would be justified in setting aside 
SIM h convev nice is fraud on creditors, 
and judgment creditor thereupon could 
h ive (xciuhnti issued and land could be 
s s! • t iccnrdance with L'R 1 14 «nd 28 1 
IS Ostler i,nnd & Livtstotk Co v 
Ilroiigh, III I )l( 178 P 2d 011 
—pleadings 
1 n It r fonnir si iluto hi Id, in nction 
in nnhire of trtditnrt bill brought to set 
aside voluntiiv toiivevnneo b\ tit btor to 
his HI ut (hit OIIIIMMIOII from bill of ullegM 
tioii of insohtnrv at lime of coiMpjniiri s 
extcutioii would not have bet n fttal to 
bill, since insolvent v at stub tunc was not 
f u t of jurisdictional t onsequem t and was 
not, per sc, condition of relief Ogden 
State Bank v Marker 12 U 13 40 P 7b > 
distinguished in r>4 U 481, 182 I 3r»7 and 
102 LI 12, 126 P 2d 1001 
Allegation* in nction to set aside con 
v e j m c c s that lonvcjanccs were made 
for the purpose of piacmg propcrfv be 
jond rent h ot creditors and were made 
us part of a 8t heme, without statement 
of facts from which purpose could be in 
ftrrcd and without stating facts con 
stitntiiig s lirme tmotinted to no more 
thin s iving th it ronvevnuees were fraudu 
lint Smith v 1 dwards, 81 U 244, 17 P 
2.1 204 
*. omplaint in it lion to s i t aside con 
VLMintc was not objt t tioimhlc for fnlure 
to nllegt Hi it property involved in con 
vtvnnce was not exempt Amiga v Jvnns, 
87 U 198, 4S V 2d 513, 101 A L R 532, 
listingtiished in 102 U 12, '26 P 2d JOol 
Collateral References 
fraudulent Convcj iiicC8C=>208 
37 C 1 S Irnudulent Comcjances §300 
37 Am Tur 2d 788 et seq, 1 ruudulent 
(. onve> IIIKCS § 10G et st q 
Vdmisstbility of declarations of grantor 
or transferor on issue as to whether con 
vevance or transfer was in fraud of credi 
tors 83 A L R 1446 
Admissibility of subsequmt dc« Inrations 
of vendor on issue whether sale was m 
fraud ot creditors l>4 A L R 707 
Assign tl ihlv of executors or ndminis 
tritortt right to attack conveynnce or 
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transfer 1»> decedent as fraud upon his 
ireditors, 150 A L R 508 
Conditions of creditor's bill or suit to 
avoid conveyance as a fraud on creditors 
whore creditor has recovered foreign judg 
incut, 129 A L H 506 
( rnditor's receipt of proceeds of convey 
ance or transfer by debtor as estop 
ping him to claim that conveyance or 
transfer was fraudulent, 9 A L R 868 
Criterion of jurisdictional amount in ac-
tion in form of creditors' bill or suit to 
avoid conveyance in fraud of creditors, 
109 A L B 118*5 
Death of grantee or transferee of prop-
er! \ conveyed or transferred in fraud of 
creditors as affecting rights of creditors of 
grantor or transferor to attach same, 110 
A I R 1190 
Decree in suit by judgment creditor to 
set aside conveyance in fraud of creditors 
as bar to another suit for same purpose in 
rripect of another conveyance, 108 A 
I, R 699 
Fact that debt, to pay or secure which 
conveyance was made, was barred by limi 
tut ion as affecting attack made upon it as 
a fraud upon creditors, 109 A L R 1220 
Judgment for fine or penalty as support 
mg creditors suit to avoid fraudulent 
conveyance or transfer before its entry, 
48 A L R 605 
Necessity of exhausting remedies 
against other judgment debtor before 
bringing suit to set aside conveyance as 
fraudulent 22 A L R 200 
Necessity of participation by the gran 
tee or transferee in the fraud of the 
grantor or transferor in order to avoid a 
voluntary conveyance of transfer as 
against creditors 17 A L R 728 
Nonresidence or absence of debtor as 
obviating ncccHSitv of procuring judg 
nient as condition of creditor's bill, 38 
A I, R 269 
Pleading and proof of exempt character 
of property in suit to set aside its convey 
nnre as in fraud of creditors, 154 A L R 
913 
Remedy of genersl creditor or judgment 
creditor as affected by Uniform Frandu 
lent Conveyance Act, 66 A L R 251, 119 
A L R 949 
Remedy of judgment creditor where 
debtor surrenders property to vendee no 
der prior security deed, 36 A L R 805 
Right of creditor of decedent, before 
perfecting his claim or after loss of re 
course against decedent's estate, to pursue 
remedy against property conveyed by the 
decedent in fraud of his creditors, 103 
A L R 555 
Right of creditor or one representing 
him to recover money paid uf property 
transferred by debtor on illegal considers 
tion, 84 A L R 1297 
Right of creditors of one spouse, either 
before or after death of other spouse, to 
attack conveyance or encumbrance of es 
tate by entireties by both spouses as in 
fraud of creditors, 121 A L R 1028 
Right of creditor to benefit of redemp 
tion from, acquisition or extinction of, 
outstanding right, title, or interest, by 
grantee or transferee in fraud of creditors, 
87 A L R 830 
Right of creditor to set aside fraudu 
lent transfer as affected by bankruptcy 
of debtor, 158 A L R 1274 
Right of creditor to set aside transfer 
of property as fraudulent as affected by 
the fact that his claim is barred by stat 
ute of limitations, 14 A L R 2d 598 
Right of individual creditor, or creditors 
of debtor in liquidation or receivership 
to maintain bill to set aside conveyances 
or transfers in fraud of creditors, 119 
A L R 1339 
Right to attack and conditions of at 
tack upon conveyance, mortgage or trans 
fer as fraudulent as against creditors as 
affected bv mortgage or other security for 
indebtedness to attacking creditors, 116 
A L R 1048 
Tort claimant's right to attack convey 
ance or transfer as fraudulent, 39 A L R 
175,73 A L R 2d 749 
25 116 Rights of creditors with claims not matured —Where a con-
xejance made or obligation incurred is fraudulent as to a creditor whose 
claim has not matured, he may proceed in a court of competent junsdic 
tion against an\ person against whom he could have proceeded, had his 
claim matured, and the court may 
(1) Restrain the defendant from disposing of his property , 
(2) Appoint a recener to take charge of the propert} , 
(3) Set aside the coineyance or annul the obligation, or, 
(4) Make any order which the circumstances of the case may require 
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History L 1026, ch 42. § 10, R 8 1933 
* O 1943, 33-1 16 
Collateral References. 
Fraudulent Conveyances<*=»217 
37 C 7 8 Fraudulent Conveyances § 74 
37 Am Jur 2d 788 et seq , Fraudulent 
Conveyances } 106 et seq 
Admissibility of declarations of grantor 
or transferor on issue as to whether con 
vejance or transfer was in fraud of credl 
tors, 83 A L R 1446 
Admissibility of subsequent declarations 
of vendor on issue whether sale was in 
fraud of creditors, 64 A L R 797 
Creditor's receipt of proceeds of convey 
ance or transfer by debtor as estopping 
him to claim that conveyance or transfer 
was fraudulent, 9 A L R 358 
Death of grantee or transferee of prop 
ertv conveyed or transferred in fraud of 
creditors as affecting rights of creditors of 
grantor or transferor to attach same, 116 
A L R 1196 
Denying relief to one who conveyed 
his property to defraud his creditors as 
applicable where the threatened claim 
which occasioned the conveyance was paid 
or was never establshed, 21 A L R 2d 
589 
Juriadiction of equity to sequester, seize, 
enjoin transfer of, or otherwiso provision 
ally secure assets for application upon 
money demand1 which has not been re 
duced to judgment, 116 A L R 270 
Nece««nry parties defendant to action 
to set aside conveyance in fraud of cred 
itors, 24 A li R 2d 395 
Necessity of exhausting remedies against 
other judgment debtor before bringing 
suit to sot aside conveyance as fraudulent, 
22 A L R 200 
Necessity of participation by the gran 
tee or transferee in the fraud of the 
grantor or transforor in order to avoid 
a voluntary conveyance of transfer as 
against creditors, 17 A L R 728 
Right of creditor of docedent, before 
perfecting his claim or after loss of re 
course against decedent's estate, to pur 
sue remedy agftinst property conveyed by 
the decedent in fraud of his creditors, 
103 A L R 555 
Right of creditor to set aside fraudulent 
transfer as affected by bankruptcy of 
dol.tor, 158 A L R 1274 
Right of stiroty or one secondarily liablo 
to bring an action before payment of ob 
ligation to set aside fraudulent convey 
nnccs by principal, 71 A L R 154 
Right of tort claimant to attack convey 
ance or transfer as fraudulent, 39 A L R 
175, 73 A L R 2d 749 
Right to attack and conditions of attack 
upon conveyance, mortgage or transfer as 
fraudulent as against creditors as affected 
by mortgage or other security for in 
ilehtedness to attacking creditor, 116 A 
L R 1048 
CHAPTER 2 
SALE OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK 
(Repealed by Laws 1965 ch 164, § 10 102) 
25 2 1 to 25 2 5 Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Sections 25 2 1 to 25 2 5 (L 1923, ch 
92, §5 1 to 5 , R 8 1933 k C 1943, 33 2 1 
to 33 2 5) , relating to sale of merchandise 
in bulk were repealed by Laws 1965, ch 
154, $ 10 102 For present provisions, seo 
70A 6 101 et seq 
CHAPTER 3 
LEASES AND SALES OP LIVESTOCK 
(Repealed by Laws 1965, ch 164, § 10 102) 
Repealed. 25-3 1 to 25 3 4 
Repeal 
Sections 25 3 1 to 25 1 4 (L 1<>17, ch 
52, SSI to 4, C L 1917, §* 130 to 133 
L 1921, ch 3, 5 1 , B 8 1933 ft C 1943, 
3 1 1 1 to 313 4), relating to lentea and 
*ales of livestock were repealed br Laws 
106% ch 154 § 10 102 
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